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ABSTRACT 
 
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN WORKPLACE 
 
People with disabilities are a minority group who has suffered disadvantage 
especially in the workplace. They currently enjoy Constitutional and legislative 
protection in a democratic South Africa. 
 
Their rights to equality and non–discrimination are entrenched in the 
Constitution,1 the Employment Equity Act2 and the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act,3 where disability is a listed prohibited 
ground of unfair discrimination. The disability of an employee is also a prohibited 
reason for dismissal in terms of the Labour Relations Act.4 People with 
disabilities furthermore are also a designated group5 who are beneficiaries under 
affirmative action measures in terms of the EEA.6    
 
Even though “disability” is a ground protected under Constitutional and statutory 
anti-discrimination provisions, the ground itself is not defined in South African 
law.  
                                                 
1 Sections 9(3) and 9(4) of the Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 
2 Section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (Hereinafter “the EEA”) 
3 Section 9 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000   
4 66 of 1995, section 187(1)(f)  
5 Section 1 of the EEA 
6 Section 15 of the EEA 
 iii
There are currently two approaches to disability, namely the medical and social 
approaches to disability.7 The medical approach to disability views disability as 
an issue of welfare8 and requires the person with a disability to be cured to fit in 
with “able-bodied” society. The social approach views disability as something that 
is created by the social environment and not necessarily only by the impairment 
a person is living with.9 It requires society to cure itself to accommodate people 
with disabilities.10  
 
The two South African court decisions of Hoffmann v South African Airways11 
and IMATU and another v City of Cape Town,12 have illustrated that disability 
discrimination remains an important issue, even though the Constitutional Court 
in Hoffmann did not treat HIV positive status as a disability,13 and the Labour 
Court in IMATU held that the second applicant’s insulin dependent diabetes 
mellitus did not amount to a disability.14  
 
Reasonable accommodation is another important aspect in respect of persons 
with disabilities in the workplace. Designated employers have a duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation to people with disabilities as part of affirmative action 
                                                 
7 Chapter 1 of the White Paper on Integrated National Disability Strategy, Office of the Deputy 
   President November 1997 
8 Ibid 
9 Chapter 1 of the White Paper on Integrated National Disability Strategy 
10 Ibid 
11 (2000) 21 ILJ 2357 (CC) 
12 [2005] 11 BLLR 1084 (LC) 
13 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2375 
14 IMATU and another v City of Cape Town 1115 
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measures taken under the EEA.15 Even though reasonable accommodation is 
phrased as an affirmative action duty in terms of the Act, it is also a principle of 
non-discrimination on the basis of disability.16 
 
What has been said above makes it clear that even in the light of disability being 
a protected ground in the Constitution and mentioned statutes, the Labour– and 
other courts were not swamped with cases dealing with disability discrimination. 
The cases of Hoffmann v SAA, which dealt with unfair discrimination on the basis 
of HIV positive status, and IMATU and another v City of Cape Town, which 
concerned unfair discrimination on the basis of insulin dependent diabetes 
mellitus, were the closest that the courts came to the issue of disability 
discrimination.  
 
Moreover, even though affirmative action is a Constitutional imperative,17 and it 
has been followed in South African law for quite some time, most of its 
jurisprudence have evolved from cases dealing with the other two designated 
groups (namely black people and women under the EEA18), and not so much 
from people with disabilities. 
 
                                                 
15 Section 15(2)(c) of the EEA 
16 Item 6.1 of the Technical Assistance Guidelines on the Employment of People with Disabilities 
    Department of Labour 2003 
17 Section 9(2) of the Constitution  
18 Section 1 of the EEA 
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Disability surely is a novel19 and important equality issue. This dissertation will 
attempt to bring some clarity to the confused areas. That will be done in the light 
of relevant domestic and foreign jurisprudence. These will include South African 
legislation and case law, International Instruments and Conventions, foreign case 
law, journal articles and books. 
 
 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      November 2008 
 
                                                 
19 Ngwena “Interpreting Aspects of the Intersection between Disability, Discrimination and  
    Equality: Lessons for the Employment Equity Act from Comparative Law.Part I (Defining  
    Disability) “ (2005) 16(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 210 at 211 
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“Again and again I admonish my students in Europe and America: Don’t aim at success -
the more you aim at it and make it a target, the more you are going to miss it. For 
success, like happiness, cannot be pursued; it must ensue, and it only does so as the 
unintended side effect of one’s personal dedication to a cause greater than oneself or as 
the by–product of one’s surrender to a person other than oneself. Happiness must 
happen, and the same holds for success: you have to let it happen by not caring about it. 
I want you to listen to what your conscience commands you to do and go on to carry it 
out to the best of your knowledge. Then you will live to see that in the long–run – in the 
long–run I say! – success will follow you precisely because you had forgotten to think 
about it.”  
                Viktor Emil Frankl 
 
 
“Do not curse a deaf man or put something in front of a blind man so as to make 
him stumble over it. Obey me; I am the LORD your God.”  
Leviticus 18:14  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Constitution20 provides that neither the State21 nor any person22 may unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on the basis of disability.  
 
The Employment Equity Act23 (hereinafter “the EEA”), which promotes the right of 
equality in the Constitution,24 lists people with disabilities as one of the 
designated groups under affirmative action measures25 and also contains a 
definition of “people with disabilities”.26 Bargaining councils,27 the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration28 and the Labour Court29 have interpreted 
this definition in the context of employment.  
 
The EEA also provides that no person may unfairly discriminate, directly or 
indirectly, against an employee or applicant for employment, in any employment 
                                                 
20 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
21 Section 9(3) of the Constitution 
22 Section 9(4) of the Constitution  
23 55 of 1998 
24 Preamble to the EEA  
25 Section 1 of the EEA 
26 Ibid  
27 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union on behalf of Lucas and Department of  
  Health (Western Cape) (2004) 25 ILJ 2091(BCA) 
28 Wylie and Standard Executors and Trustees (2006) 27 ILJ 2210 (CCMA)  
29 IMATU and another v City of Cape Town [2005] 11 BLLR 1084 (LC) and Standard Bank of  
   South Africa v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and others [2008] 4 BLLR 
   356 (LC) 
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policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including disability.30 South African 
courts have not yet dealt with the issue of disability discrimination, but two cases, 
both of which had been decided in the employment context, have come close to 
this matter. Hoffmann v South African Airways,31 a Constitutional Court decision, 
concerned the validity of an employer’s refusal in terms of a blanket employment 
ban to appoint a person to a position of cabin attendant for reason of the job 
applicant’s HIV status. In IMATU and another v City of Cape Town,32 the Labour 
Court had to determine the validity of a person’s exclusion in terms of a blanket 
employment ban from a position of firefighter for reason of the person living with 
insulin dependent diabetes mellitus.  
 
The EEA further requires people with disabilities to be reasonably 
accommodated in a job or the working environment, where it is needed.33 The 
Labour Court in Standard Bank of South Africa v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration34 exposed, amongst others, the content of an 
employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate, where needed, an employee or job 
applicant with a disability. A Code of Good Practice on the Employment of 
People with Disabilities, which “… deals with the full employment cycle…”35 of 
people with disabilities, has also been issued in terms of the EEA. The Promotion 
                                                 
30 Section 6(1) of the EEA  
31 (2000) 21 ILJ 2357 (CC) 
32 [2005] 11 BLLR 1084 (LC) 
33 Section 1 of the EEA 
34 See footnote 10  
35 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union on behalf of Lucas and Department of  
   Health (Western Cape) (2004) 25 ILJ 2091 (BCA) 2098  
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of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act,36 which is not labour 
legislation and does not apply to anyone to whom the EEA applies, nor  to the 
extent to which the EEA applies,37 also prohibits unfair discrimination on the 
basis of disability.38  
 
The Labour Relations Act39 gives effect to the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices40 and provides that a dismissal for which the reason is that an employer 
unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary 
ground, including disability, is automatically unfair.41  
 
The Republic of South Africa is also a signatory State to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The purpose of the 
Convention is “to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to 
promote respect for their inherent dignity.”42 South Africa has accordingly 
acquired International Law obligations towards people with disabilities which it 
must fulfil.  
 
In light of the abovementioned protections that people with disabilities enjoy 
under International Law, the Constitution and, importantly, labour legislation, this 
                                                 
36 4 of 2000  
37 Section 5(3) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
38 Section 9 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
39 66 of 1995 
40 Section 27 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, which is now  
   section 23(1) of the current Constitution.   
41 Section 187(1)(f) of the Labour Relations Act  
42 Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
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paper will investigate who the “people with disabilities”, that form the subject of 
the abovementioned protections, in terms of the EEA are. It will further examine 
how a person needs to prove a claim of unfair discrimination on the basis of 
disability in terms of the EEA and when discrimination on the basis of disability 
will not be unfair in terms of the EEA. This study will further investigate the 
content of an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate an employee or job 
applicant with a disability where needed, and whether there is a difference 
between a disability and medical incapacity of an employee in the context of 
dismissal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE DEFINITION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES  
 
2.1 The medical and social approaches to disability 
 
There are two schools of thought with respect to the concept of disability, namely 
the medical and social approaches to disability.  
 
The older medical approach treated disability as a health and welfare issue and 
called upon the State and society to care for people with disabilities.43 It dictated 
that people with disabilities were objects of pity and were to be cared for44 and 
thereby did not treat the group as independent human beings with human dignity. 
The White Paper on Integrated National Disability Strategy states that many of 
the organizations that were founded for people with disabilities, are run by “able–
bodied” individuals,45 who may not have the expertise for what people with 
disabilities really require. The medical model focused on the medical condition or 
impairment of the person with a disability.46 A fatal flaw in this approach is that it 
“personalises” disability by treating it as the person’s own problem and advocates 
                                                 
43 Chapter 1 of the White Paper on National Integrated Disability Strategy  
    Office of the Deputy President, November 1997 
44 Chapter 1 of the White Paper on Integrated National Disability Strategy: The Medical Model of 
    Disability 
45 Ibid 
46 Grobbelaar–Du Plessis “Gestremdheid as ‘n menseregte–konsep: ‘n Internasionale  
    klemverskuiwing” (2005) 2 De Jure 353 at 359 
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that attempts to cure or treat the disability would manage or solve the person’s 
disability problem.47 
 
The social model is based on the notion that the adverse circumstances that 
people with disabilities endure, and the unfair discrimination to which they are 
subjected do not flow from their impairment, but from the social environment.48 
This school of thought places emphasis on the failure of society to accommodate 
people with disabilities and the fact that disability (of an individual) does not 
mean “inability”.49 The social model, which is also known as the human rights 
model of disability, centralizes the person with the disability – and his or her 
human dignity – and does not focus on impairment.50 The disability of the person, 
which was the individual’s problem in terms of the medical model, becomes 
society’s problem51 and the latter must change to fit the impaired person and not 
vice versa.52 The social model of disability as described here, is in line with 
substantive equality.53 No country follows the social approach to disability in its 
purest form54 and both the medical and social approaches to disability are 
required when disability is interpreted.55 
 
                                                 
47 Olivier and Smit “Disability” in Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa 13(2) Labour Law and  
   Social Security Law 230  
48 Chapter 1 of the White Paper on Integrated National Disability Strategy: The Social Model of  
    Disability 
49 Ibid 
50 Grobbelaar–Du Plessis op cit 359 
51 Ibid 
52 Chapter 1 of the White Paper on Integrated National Disability Strategy  
53 Olivier and Smit op cit 230 
54 Ngwena “Interpreting Aspects of the Intersection between Disability, Discrimination and  
   Equality: Lessons for the Employment Equity Act from Comparative Law. Part I (Defining    
   Disability)” (2005) 16(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 210 at 222 
55 Ibid 
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2.2 The definition of “people with disabilities” 
 
The Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with 
Disabilities provides that “disability” refers to different functional limitations that 
occur in any population in any country of the world.56 The Standard Rules provide 
that people may be disabled by physical, intellectual or sensory impairments, 
medical conditions or mental illness, all of which may be permanent or transitory 
in nature.57 In terms of the Rules, a “handicap” is a loss or a limitation of 
opportunities for a person to participate in society on an equal basis with 
others.58 “Handicap” also refers to the interplay between the person with a 
disability and the environment and it illustrates that the social environment, 
amongst others, does not sufficiently cater for the needs of persons with 
disabilities and prevents persons with disabilities from participating on an equal 
basis with others.59 Article 14 of the Standard Rules on the Equalization of 
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities states that the Rules are not 
compulsory, but may become customary international rules if it is applied by a 
sufficient number of states which have the intention of adhering to a rule in 
international law. 
 
                                                 
56 Article 17 of the UN Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with  
   Disabilities 
   Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 48/96 of 20 December 1993 
57 Ibid 
58 Article 18 of the UN Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with  
   Disabilities 
59 Ibid 
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The World Health Organization’s International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health of 2001 describes disability as a result of a relationship 
between a person’s medical or health condition and the person’s personal 
circumstances as well as environmental factors, and has also moved towards a 
social approach to disability.  
 
South Africa has recently become a signatory state to the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter “the UN Disability Convention”),60 
which contains a definition of persons with disabilities. The UN Disability 
Convention states that persons with disabilities are individuals with long-term 
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments, whose impairments may in 
interaction with various barriers hinder the individual’s full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others.61 The UN Disability 
Convention acknowledges that a physical, mental, sensory or intellectual 
impairment is but the tip of the iceberg when it comes to defining a person with a 
disability. There are also existing structures (“various barriers”) that in synergy 
with the individual’s particular impairment (“interaction”), prevent, limit or exclude 
(“hinder”) the individual from fully and effectively participating in society on an 
equal basis with other “able-bodied” individuals.  
 
The Employment Equity Act stipulates that people with disabilities are people 
who have a long-term or recurring physical or mental impairment that 
                                                 
60 The Convention is not yet being adhered to. 
61 Article 1 of the UN Disability Convention 
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substantially limits their prospects of entry into, or advancement in, 
employment.62 Item 5.1 of the Code of Good Practice on the Employment of 
People with Disabilities,63 states that the Code provides protection for people with 
disabilities in employment and does so by not focusing on the impairment or on 
the medical diagnosis of the person concerned, but on the effects that the 
person’s disability has on the person in the working environment. Even though 
the abovementioned provision indeed portrays strong characteristics of the social 
approach to disability, the South African definition of “people with disabilities” 
does not subscribe to a purely social model. Rather, there is a marriage of the 
two approaches in the definition. The South African definition combines the 
certainty64 of the medical model (“people who have a long-term or recurring 
physical or mental impairment…”) with the social model’s sensitivity and 
awareness that external factors also contribute to the creation of disability 
(“…which substantially limits their prospects of entry into, or advancement in, 
employment”), to produce “people with disabilities”. Where disability is based on 
impairment, as is the case with the South African definition, it will not be difficult 
to identify people with disabilities as a group.65 Moreover, when impairment forms 
the basis of disability, it will enable someone to differentiate between people who 
experience disadvantage because of their disability and those who are 
marginalised because of other attributes.66  
                                                 
62 Section 1 of the EEA 
63 This Code was issued in terms of section 54(1)(a) of the EEA and will hereinafter be referred to 
    as “the Disability Code”.  
64 Ngwena and Pretorius “Code of Good Practice on the Employment of People with Disabilities:  
    An Appraisal” (2003) 24 Industrial Law Journal (ILJ) 1817 at 1821 
65 Ngwena (2005) 227 
66 Ngwena and Pretorius (2003) 1822 
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The Disability Code analyses the definition of “people with disabilities” as 
contained in section 1 of the EEA and provides three requirements for an 
individual to be a person with a disability in terms of the Act. The Code provides 
that a person must have a physical or mental impairment, which must be long-
term or recurring and that such impairment must have a substantial limitation on 
the person’s prospects of entering into or advancing in employment.67  
 
The Disability Code states that an impairment can be physical or mental in 
nature, or can be a combination of the two.68 A physical impairment is a partial or 
total loss of a person’s bodily function or a part of a person’s body, and includes 
sensory impairments.69 A mental impairment is a condition or illness that has 
been “clinically recognized” (by a medical professional) and that influences or 
impacts on the thought processes, emotions or judgement of the person.70  
 
The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health defines an 
impairment as a “problem” in an anatomical part of the body, or in a 
psychological or physiological function of a body system.71 This “problem” may 
flow from a loss, variance or defect in a body part or physiological or 
psychological function of a body system, or where such a body part or function 
“substantially deviates” from what is accepted to be normal in a biomedical 
                                                 
67 Item 5.1 of the Disability Code  
68 Item 5.1.1(i) of the Disability Code  
69 Item 5.1.1(ii) of the Disability Code  
70 Item 5.1.1(iii) of the Disability Code  
71 International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health World Health Organization 
    2001 
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sense.72 When a person’s leg is amputated above the knee or a person is short 
sighted, such persons are impaired, because they “significantly deviate” from 
what is accepted to be normal in the biomedical sense, viz. that people normally 
have two fully functioning legs or sufficient sight.  
 
With regards to mental impairments, the Disability Code emphasises that the 
condition or illness must be “clinically recognized”.73 There is a presumption of 
sanity in South African law74 and a person who relies on a mental condition or 
illness must prove that such condition or illness exists.75 A court or quasi-judicial 
body must hear expert evidence on a condition or illness that is claimed to form 
the basis of, or amounts to, a mental impairment and must make a finding of fact 
on whether such condition or illness is clinically recognized.76  
 
It is important to note that when a physical or mental impairment is established 
through medical evidence or otherwise, the presence thereof lays a foundation 
for disability, but does not, in itself, constitute a disability. Physical and mental 
impairments encompass more than diseases or disorders77 and in the words of 
the Technical Assistance Guidelines on the Employment of People with 
Disabilities,78 “[p]eople with disabilities are not conditions or diseases”.79 An 
                                                 
72 Ibid 
73 Item 5.1.1 (iii) of the Disability Code  
74 Burchell and Milton Principles of Criminal Law  390 
75 Ibid 391 
76 Ngwena and Pretorius (2003) 1822 
77 International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health 2001 
78 The Technical Assistance Guidelines on the Employment of People with Disabilities 
    Department of Labour 2003 
79 Item 1.3.1.1 of the Technical Assistance Guidelines on the Employment of People with  
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impairment is but one component to establish in determining whether an 
individual is a person with a disability.  
 
The second requirement of the definition is that the physical or mental 
impairment, if established, must be long-term or recurring.80 A physical or mental 
impairment is long-term if such impairment has lasted or is likely to last for at 
least twelve months.81 A mental or physical impairment is recurring if such 
impairment is likely to occur again and if it is substantially limiting.82  
 
The abovementioned requirement addresses the period of the physical or mental 
impairment83 and indicates that the EEA (which precedes the Disability Code) 
seeks to protect people whose disabilities persist, rather than people who have 
temporary disabilities.84 The fact that a “long-term” impairment is one that has 
lasted or is likely to last for at least twelve months, provides a matter of certainty 
in respect of the duration of the impairment,85 and yet it is only a starting point, as 
it will be difficult in certain instances to predict how long an impairment may 
continue.86 The twelve month period for a long-term impairment is a flexible 
yardstick for determining duration.87  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
    Disabilities 
80 Item 5.1.2 of the Disability Code 
81 Item 5.1.2 (i) of the Disability Code  
82 Item 5.1.2 (ii) of the Disability Code  
83 Ngwena and Pretorius (2003) 1823 
84 Ngwena (2005) 228 
85 Ibid 230 
86 Ngwena and Pretorius (2003) 1824 
87 Ibid 
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The Disability Code further states that a progressive condition is a condition that 
is likely to change, develop or recur. It also states that people who have 
progressive conditions only become people with disabilities if their progressive 
conditions become substantially limiting.88 The Code also provides that 
progressive or recurring conditions that are asymptomatic or that do not have a 
substantially limiting effect on a person, are not disabilities.89 
 
In respect of progressive or recurring conditions that do not constitute disabilities 
where such conditions are asymptomatic or not substantially limiting, Ngwena   
states that such an approach follows the medical model and not the social model 
of disability.90 He states that the above provision of the Disability Code is 
indifferent to the fact that perceptions of medical conditions, even where such a 
condition is not a disability for the purposes of the EEA or the Code, can also 
have a disabling effect on the particular individual and make the “carrier” of the 
medical condition vulnerable to discrimination.91 In doing so, he endorses the 
social approach to disability.92 In this regard it is submitted that the South African 
definition of “people with disabilities” focuses on people with actual disabilities 
and does not include people with perceived disabilities, as is the case with the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which will be discussed later in this 
Chapter.  
 
                                                 
88 Item 5.1.2 (iii) of the Disability Code 
89 Ibid 
90 Ngwena (2005) 230 
91 Ibid 
92 Ibid 
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The third requirement of “people with disabilities” is that the long-term or 
recurring physical or mental impairment must be substantially limiting.93 Ngwena 
and Pretorius state that a court or quasi-judicial body has to holistically assess 
the effects of a person’s long-term or recurring physical or mental impairment on 
the latter’s employment to make a factual finding whether such impairment is 
substantially limiting.94 According to the Disability Code, an impairment is 
substantially limiting if in its nature, duration or effects, it substantially limits the 
person’s ability to perform the essential functions of the job for which the person 
is considered.95 The abovementioned means that the impairment itself (the type 
of impairment), the period of the impairment or the impact the impairment has on 
the person, can substantially limit the person’s ability to perform the essential 
functions of the job in question.  
  
The Disability Code states that certain impairments that can easily be controlled, 
corrected or lessened, are not substantially limiting.96 It states that when a 
person uses corrective devices which correct or ameliorate his or her impairment, 
such a person will not have a disability.97 When the particular impairment is 
however substantial even with the use of the corrective devices – in other words, 
when the corrective devices do not correct or ameliorate the impairment – the 
person has a disability.98  
                                                 
93 Item 5.1.3 of the Disability Code 
94 Ngwena and Pretorius (2003) 1826 
95 Item 5.1.3 (i) of the Disability Code 
96 Item 5.1.3 (ii) of the Disability Code  
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The Code also states that when an assessment is conducted to determine 
whether the effects of an impairment is substantially limiting, such assessment 
must determine whether medical treatment or other devices can control or 
correct the impairment so that the effects thereof can be prevented or removed.99 
In other words, the abovementioned assessment must determine whether 
“medical treatment or other devices” can control or correct the impairment so that 
such impairment is not substantially limiting. The Code further states that when 
there is uncertainty about whether an impairment is substantially limiting, an 
assessment to that effect may be done by a suitably qualified person.100  
 
The Disability Code also states that certain conditions and impairments may for 
public policy reasons not be regarded as disabilities.101 The conditions and 
impairments include, but are not limited to:  
• sexual behaviour disorders that are against public policy; 
• tattoos and body piercing; 
• compulsive gambling and a tendency to steal or light fires; 
• disorders that affect a person’s mental or physical state if caused by the 
current use of illegal drugs or alcohol, unless the individual affected is 
participating in a recognized treatment programme and  
• normal deviations in height, weight and strength and conventional physical 
and mental characteristics and common personality traits.102 
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In respect of the public policy exclusions that are contained in item 5.1.2(iv) of 
the Disability Code, Ngwena and Pretorius confirm that the Disability Code is 
premised on the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of disability.103 They 
state that when a person has an impairment that falls within the ambit of the 
public policy exclusions, the person does not have a disability for the purposes of 
the Disability Code and the person is not covered by the protections offered in 
the Code and the EEA.104 Owing to the fact that the public policy exclusions do 
not constitute disabilities, it follows that when discrimination is perpetrated 
against such persons on such grounds, the discrimination will either be regarded 
as automatically fair because of the public policy exclusion, or the perpetrator of 
the discrimination need not show that it is justified or fair.105 They submit that this 
goes against the Constitution which, in section 9(5), requires discrimination to be 
shown to be fair.106 Ngwena and Pretorius state that the public policy exclusions, 
that is a limitation on the constitutional right of non-discrimination on the basis of 
disability, cannot usurp the function of the limitations clause in determining 
whether a limitation of a specific right (in this instance, equality) is fair.107 
 
When a person has an impairment or condition that falls within the scope of the 
public policy exclusions, such person will not have a disability, as is apparent 
from item 5.1.3(iv) of the Disability Code. The Disability Code flows from the EEA 
                                                 
103 Ngwena and Pretorius (2003) 1829. Item 4 of the Disability Code states that the Code is 
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that deals inter alia with the prohibition of unfair discrimination in the context of 
employment. When discrimination is perpetrated in the employment context 
against a person on the basis of the abovementioned impairments or conditions, 
the complainant will not be able to allege discrimination on the basis of disability. 
The complainant must prove the facts upon which discrimination can be 
established108 as well as the relevant impairment or condition that is the ground 
for discrimination, for example tattoos, body piercing or a tendency to light fires. 
 
If a court finds that the complainant was able to show discrimination and that the 
ground relied upon by the complainant amounts to an analogous ground of 
discrimination, then the employer needs to show that the discrimination on the 
analogous ground is fair.109 In the employment context, the employer may do so 
either in terms of the inherent requirements of the job or in terms of affirmative 
action taken in accordance with the purpose of the EEA.110 The limitations clause 
that is contained in section 36 of the Constitution usually does not come into play 
in respect of the fairness or justification of discrimination in the employment 
context. 
 
The public policy exceptions accordingly do not represent an automatic 
justification of discrimination on the grounds contained therein, nor does it usurp 
the functions of the limitations clause. It does not concern discrimination or its 
                                                 
108 Cooper “The Boundaries of Equality in Labour Law” (2004) 25 ILJ 813 at 829 
109 Section 11 of the EEA. In IMATU and another v City of Cape Town, Murphy AJ held at 1113  
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justification, but lists impairments and conditions that do not constitute 
disabilities. If these grounds are established as analogous to the listed grounds 
of discrimination, the legal principles pertaining to employment discrimination 
must run its course and an employer needs to establish the fairness of 
discrimination on these grounds.   
 
2.3 South African case law 
 
In IMATU and another v City of Cape Town,111 the Labour Court had to 
determine amongst others, whether the insulin dependent diabetes mellitus of Mr 
Murdoch, a law enforcement officer who wished to become a firefighter, 
amounted to a disability for the purposes of the EEA.  
 
The Labour Court applied the requirements of “people with disabilities” as 
contained in the Disability Code, to determine whether Mr Murdoch’s type I 
diabetes constituted a disability.112 The Labour Court heard extensive medical 
evidence on the issue of diabetes and found that insulin dependent diabetes 
mellitus was a physical (bodily) impairment.113 The court also found that type I 
diabetes was a long-term impairment, because it lasted for the rest of a person’s 
life and is incurable.114 It stated that type I diabetics were, for the rest of their 
lives, dependent on insulin that had to be administered either by themselves, or 
                                                 
111 [2005] 11 BLLR 1084 (LC) 
112 Supra 1114  
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by other persons and that a failure to take insulin would result in the death of the 
person.115 
 
Murphy AJ also had to determine whether Mr Murdoch’s long-term physical 
impairment substantially limited his ability to perform the essential functions of 
the job of a firefighter.116 The court cited the provisions of the Disability Code that 
required a court or quasi-judicial body to take into account medical treatment or 
other corrective devices that could control or correct an impairment so that the 
adverse effects thereof were prevented or removed, in determining whether an 
impairment is substantially limiting.117 It found on the basis of medical evidence, 
that Mr Murdoch could, by using fast-acting insulin, control his type I diabetes so 
that the adverse effect thereof (which was a possible hypoglycaemic attack whilst 
on fighting a fire) were prevented or removed in his working environment.118 The 
fast-acting insulin was the “medical treatment” or “corrective device” that Mr 
Murdoch had used for years to control his diabetes to prevent debilitating 
hypoglycaemia, which the Labour Court took into account in determining that his 
long-term impairment was not substantially limiting.119  
 
The court found that even though Mr Murdoch’s type I diabetes was a long-term 
physical impairment, it was not a substantial limitation on his ability to perform 
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the essential duties of a firefighter,120 and he was already performing duties as a 
voluntary firefighter for a period of thirteen years without suffering a 
hypoglycaemic attack.121 Murphy AJ stated that a person living with diabetes 
mellitus was not a person with a disability for the purposes of the EEA and that 
Murdoch did not satisfy the definition of “people with disabilities” as contained in 
the Disability Code.122  
 
Ngwena and Pretorius state that the Labour Court in IMATU appeared to have 
treated the Disability Code as the main source of the term “people with 
disabilities”, while the main source of the term is the EEA itself.123 Although item   
5 of the Disability Code restates the definition of “people with disabilities”, the 
main source thereof remains section 1 of the EEA.124 
 
In National Education Health and Allied Workers Union on behalf of Lucas and 
Department of Health (Western Cape)125 the applicant, Ms Lucas, was a general 
worker in a hospital’s nursing department who sustained a work-related injury to 
her back. She also sustained another injury in the course of employment nine 
months later that had an adverse effect on her initial injury.126 In casu, the 
Arbitrator determined amongst others, whether Ms Lucas was a person with a 
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disability for the purposes of the EEA.127  The Arbitrator applied the analysis of 
the term “people with disabilities” as contained in item 5 of the Disability Code128 
and found that Ms Lucas was a person with a disability, because: 
 
Ms Lucas’s back injury was a physical impairment.129 Her physical impairment 
was also long–term, because her back injury lasted for at least twelve months.130 
The Arbitrator found that Ms Lucas’s back injury was also substantially limiting, 
because it had an adverse effect on her ability to perform some of her duties as a 
general worker in the nursing department.131 As a result of her spinal injury, Ms 
Lucas could no longer pick up heavy objects in the nursing department.132 The 
Arbitrator held, on the basis of evidence, that Ms Lucas walked and climbed 
stairs with difficulty.133 She also could not sit or stand for long periods as a result 
of the injury, and the medication that she used for her injury, affected her ability 
to work adversely.134 The medication often caused her to fall asleep at her desk 
in the sewing room, to where she was moved from the nursing department.135 
The Arbitrator also held that Ms Lucas could not perform her duties in the 
needlework department efficiently.136 She stated that Ms Lucas’s back injury 
could not be ameliorated or corrected to remove its limiting effects on her ability 
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to perform the functions of her job in the nursing department and the sewing 
room,137 which made her impairment substantially limiting.  
 
Ms Lucas’s back injury also restricted her from entering into other employment. 
She applied unsuccessfully for an administrative post and could make no 
progress when she applied for posts with duties she could fulfil.138 The applicant 
was accordingly a person with a disability.  
 
The Arbitrator comprehensively and compassionately applied the requirements 
and analysis of the term “people with disabilities” as contained in the EEA and 
Disability Code to determine whether Ms Lucas was a person with a disability. 
She thereby set an example for courts and quasi-judicial bodies to do the same.  
 
In Wylie and Standard Executors and Trustees,139 Ms Wylie, the applicant, was 
living with multiple sclerosis.140 The Commissioner had to determine whether Ms 
Wylie was a person with a disability.141 He considered the analysis of “people 
with disabilities” as contained in item 5 of the Code of Good Practice on the 
Employment of People with Disabilities (incorrectly cited by the Commissioner as 
“the Technical Assistance Guidelines on the Employment of People with 
Disabilities” – which is supplementary to the Code of Good Practice) and found 
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that Ms Wylie’s multiple sclerosis constituted a disability for the purposes of the 
EEA and Disability Code.142 
 
The Commissioner in Wylie followed NEHAWU on behalf of Lucas and 
Department of Health (Western Cape), but did not apply the requirements of 
“people with disabilities” as comprehensively as Arbitrator Christie did in the 
latter. On the basis of considering the requirements of “people with disabilities”, 
he found that Ms Wylie had a disability and therefore was a person with a 
disability for the purposes of the EEA.143 
 
In Van Zyl v Thebe Employee Benefits Risk Group (Pty) Ltd,144 the respondent 
dismissed for operational reasons an applicant who suffered from schizophrenia. 
The Commissioner treated the applicant’s schizophrenia as a disability without 
determining whether the applicant’s medical condition amounted to a disability. 
The Commissioner did so because the respondent admitted that the applicant’s 
schizophrenia constituted a disability.145 
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2.4 Is a person who has a disability necessarily a person with a 
disability? 
 
It is submitted that the third requirement of “people with disabilities” as contained 
in the EEA and Disability Code – namely that the long-term or recurring 
impairment must be substantially limiting – is the determining factor in deciding 
whether or not an individual is a person with a disability. Without the third 
requirement, an individual is a person with a long-term or recurring physical or 
mental impairment (similar to what the Labour Court decided in respect of Mr 
Murdoch in IMATU v City of Cape Town) and not a person with a disability. 
Ngwena and Pretorius confirm146 with regards to the abovementioned issue that 
the EEA prohibits unfair discrimination on the basis of disability, but does not 
define disability.147 In fact, the EEA only contains a definition of “people with 
disabilities”. They pose the question whether a court can utilize the requirements 
of “people with disabilities” as contained in the EEA and Disability Code to 
determine whether a medical condition constitutes a disability, as was the case in 
IMATU v City of Cape Town.148  
 
Their question essentially is whether “people with disabilities” in terms of the EEA 
amounts to “disability” in terms of the EEA149 and whether a person who has a 
disability is indeed a person with a disability in terms of section 1 of the EEA. 
                                                 
146 Ngwena and Pretorius (2007) 754  
147 In doing so, they refer to IMATU at 1114, where Murphy AJ stated that the EEA does not  
    define disability, but that the Disability Code (and the EEA) defines “people with disabilities”.    
148 Ngwena and Pretorius (2007) 755 
149 Ibid 
 25
Ngwena and Pretorius state that disability (which is not defined in the EEA), 
needs to be defined for the purpose of non-discrimination in the EEA,150 because 
the Act states it as a ground upon which unfair discrimination is prohibited. They 
propose that disability for the purpose of non-discrimination in the EEA should be 
a “long-term or recurring physical or mental impairment”151 and state that the 
Labour Court in IMATU erred by not finding that Mr Murdoch’s insulin-dependent 
diabetes mellitus amounted to a disability.152 
 
Ngwena and Pretorius argue that the requirement that a long-term or recurring 
physical or mental impairment be substantially limiting, is more at home with the 
concept of “people with disabilities” than with “disability”,153 because people who 
are disabled have suffered discrimination in the workplace for reason of their 
physical or mental impairments and not because the extent of their disabilities 
have restricted them from entering into or advancing in employment.154 In other 
words, people who have disabilities have suffered discrimination in the workplace 
not because their disabilities were substantially limiting, but because they had 
disabilities.  
 
On the issue whether “disability” is equivalent to “people with disabilities”, 
Ngwena and Pretorius confirm that the EEA lists disability as a prohibited ground 
of unfair discrimination in its Chapter II, but that “people with disabilities” is one of 
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the groups to whom affirmative action measures are directed in terms of Chapter 
III of the EEA.155 They state that the term “people with disabilities” is a “legal term 
of art” in terms of the EEA.156 To them, the term “people with disabilities” refers to 
a specific group of persons who have been chosen to be beneficiaries under 
affirmative action and not owing to disability.157 
 
What is interesting about the IMATU judgment, is that the Labour Court applied 
the term “people with disabilities” not to determine whether Mr Murdoch was a 
“person with a disability”, but whether he had a disability. The Labour Court had 
to determine the status of his medical condition to establish whether the ground 
of the alleged discrimination was indeed that of disability.158 Mr Murdoch’s 
alleged disability itself was one of the focus points of the court and not whether 
he was a “person with a disability” as envisaged by the EEA. 
 
Wylie and Standard Executors and Trustees is a mirror image of the Labour 
Court’s approach in IMATU, but only with an opposite outcome. In Wylie, the 
status of the applicant’s medical condition (multiple sclerosis) was also an issue 
before the CCMA. The Commissioner considered the Disability Code and came 
to the conclusion that Ms Wylie’s multiple sclerosis amounted to a disability: 
“When this definition is considered the conclusion is inescapable that the applicant’s condition 
amounts to a disability as envisaged in the EEA and disability code.” 159 
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The Commissioner used deductive reasoning and concluded that because Ms 
Wylie had a disability, she was a “person with a disability” (as a member of the 
designated group in terms of section 1 of the EEA):  
“Since the applicant is a person with a disability it must be considered whether the respondent 
could not have reasonably accommodated her prior to the dismissal.” 160 
 
In NEHAWU on behalf of Lucas and Department of Health (Western Cape), the 
status of Ms Lucas’s medical condition was not an issue. In other words, the 
Arbitrator did not decide whether Ms Lucas’s spinal injury amounted to a 
disability. Instead the Arbitrator employed the term “people with disabilities” to 
determine whether Ms Lucas was a “person with a disability” and not whether 
she had a disability. 
 
There must be a distinction between instances where the status of an individual’s 
medical condition needs to be determined and where it has to be determined 
whether a person with an impairment is a member of the designated group as a 
“legal term of art”. In cases where the term “people with disabilities” is applied to 
determine whether a person’s medical condition amounts to a disability, the 
status of the person’s condition may be confirmed – whether the person has a 
disability or not – but there might still be uncertainty whether the individual is a 
person with a disability.  
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Ngwena and Pretorius state that due to the fact that the Constitution lists 
“disability” in an unqualified manner in its anti-discrimination clause161 and that 
the EEA (and Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act), 
which give effect to the Constitution’s anti-discrimination clauses, also refers to 
disability in the same manner in their own antidiscrimination clauses,162 
“disability” should be interpreted in a generous manner, without the qualification 
of substantial limitation that is required for “people with disabilities”.163 
 
The Labour Court, in Standard Bank of South Africa v Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others,164 appears to have 
appreciated  the distinction between “disability” and “people with disabilities” as 
proposed by Ngwena and Pretorius. In supra case the third respondent was 
living with a medical condition known as fibromyalgia, which resulted from a back 
injury she sustained.165 The Labour Court stated that the parties to the dismissal 
dispute agreed that the employee’s fibromyalgia was a long-term physical 
impairment and accordingly a disability.166 It equated a long-term physical 
impairment to a disability in this case, without mentioning that such impairment 
must also substantially limit the person’s prospects of entry into, or advancement 
in employment, which is required for “people with disabilities”.   
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The court later also stated that when a court or other forum was confronted with 
an employee who was dismissed for incapacity, such court or forum also had to 
determine whether such employee is a person with a long-term or recurring 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits the person’s prospects of 
entering into or advancing in employment – in other words, a member of the 
group “people with disabilities” as defined in section 1 of the EEA.167 It 
distinguished between “disability”, which does not contain the requirement of 
substantial limitation and “people with disabilities”, which contains the last 
requirement.  
 
2.5 The definitions of “disability” contained in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 and United Kingdom Disability Discrimination 
Act of 1995 
 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 contains a definition of “disability”. It 
states that disability in respect of a person refers to a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the 
person.168 A “disability” of a person also means a record of a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or major of the major life activities of the 
person169 or where the person is regarded as having a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of his/her major life activities.170 
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The Act provides that a “qualified individual with a disability” is a person who, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions 
of the job in which the person is employed or which the person wishes to do.171   
 
The United Kingdom Disability Discrimination Act of 1995 provides that a person 
has a disability for the purposes of the Act if the person has a physical or mental 
impairment that has a long-term adverse effect on the person’s ability to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities.172 A “disabled person” in terms of the UK Disability 
Discrimination Act is a person who has a disability as defined.173 A disabled 
person is not only a person who has a current disability, but also one who had a 
disability as defined in the past.174 The effect of a physical or mental impairment 
is long-term where the impairment has lasted for at least twelve months, is likely 
to last for at least twelve months or is likely to last for the rest of the life of the 
person concerned.175 According to the UK Disability Discrimination Act, a 
physical or mental impairment affects the ability of the person to carry out normal 
day-to-day activities only if such impairment affects one of the following: mobility, 
manual dexterity, physical coordination, continence, the ability to lift, carry or 
otherwise move everyday objects, speech, hearing or eyesight, memory or ability 
to concentrate, learn or understand or the perception of the risk of physical 
danger.176 
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Both the Americans with Disabilities Act and the UK Disability Discrimination Act 
base their concepts of “disability” on physical and mental impairment. Both 
pieces of legislation also emphasise the importance of substantial limitation of 
the physical or mental impairment in respect of a person with a disability, which 
make their definitions of “disability” to that extent similar to the EEA’s definitional 
requirements of “people with disabilities”. The South African definition of “people 
with disabilities” is however narrower than its counterparts in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and UK Disability Discrimination Act. The definition of “disability” 
contained in the Americans with Disabilities Act is very broad and focuses on 
actual, past or perceived physical and mental impairment, while the UK Disability 
Discrimination Act focuses on actual and past mental and physical impairment. 
The South African definition of “people with disabilities” focuses only on actual 
physical or mental impairment. This will inevitably mean that the South African 
definition will be narrowly interpreted and that not every person with a medical 
condition, no matter how it may be perceived, will be a person with a disability.  
 
Ngwena and Pretorius state that the Disability Code focuses on people with 
actual disabilities and fails to acknowledge that there are conditions such as HIV 
that substantially limits the entry and advancement in employment of the person 
living with it, even though the person with HIV is not impaired.177  
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2.6 Does HIV positive status constitute a disability? 
 
The White Paper on Integrated National Disability Strategy states that a person 
who is infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (a person who is HIV 
positive) is not a person with a disability, even though such persons are 
subjected to the same type of discrimination that people with disabilities 
experience.178 According to the White Paper, a person living with HIV is a person 
with a disability when symptoms that arise from HIV infection interfere with the 
person’s normal functioning.179 Where the virus in HIV positive persons has 
progressed to full-blown AIDS and people have acquired disabilities as a result of 
the progression, such persons are a vulnerable group180 and qualify as people 
with disabilities for the purpose of the White Paper.   
 
In terms of the Code of Good Practice: Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS and 
Employment, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is a virus that attacks and may 
destroy the body’s natural immune system. A person is HIV positive when a 
person has tested positive for infection with the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus,181 and has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome or AIDS when a 
person’s immune system has ceased to function properly because of HIV 
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infection, which has led to the onset of life-threatening infections in such a 
person.182 
 
A person who is HIV positive is accordingly not a person with a disability for the 
sole reason of his or her HIV positive status. When the symptoms of HIV have a 
disabling effect or a person acquires disabilities as a result of the progression of 
the virus, such a person will have a disability, not for reason of HIV, but due to its 
effects or disabilities acquired.  
 
The Constitution did not initially list HIV status as a ground of unfair 
discrimination in its equality clause. In the year 2000 however, the Constitutional 
Court in Hoffmann v South African Airways183 elevated HIV positive status to one 
of the unlisted analogous grounds of unfair discrimination in the Constitution. In 
Hoffmann v SAA, the Constitutional Court had to decide on the constitutionality of 
an employment practice of South African Airways of not appointing people living 
with HIV to the position of cabin attendants.  
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Hoffmann v South African Airways  
 
Mr Hoffmann applied to the SAA for the position of cabin attendant.184 He was 
found to be a suitable job applicant for this position during selection, but also had 
to undergo a medical examination and a blood test before SAA would appoint 
him to the position.185 According to the medical examination, Mr Hoffmann was fit 
and suitable for the position of cabin attendant.186 The blood test revealed that Mr 
Hoffmann was a person living with HIV.187 Owing to Mr Hoffmann’s HIV status 
and the respondent’s employment practice (or blanket ban), he was found to be 
unsuitable for employment and not appointed to the position of cabin 
attendant.188 Mr Hoffmann approached the Witwatersrand Local Division to 
challenge the constitutionality of the employer’s blanket ban on the basis that the 
ban had infringed upon his rights to equality, human dignity and fair labour 
practices in the Constitution.189 He also applied to the Witwatersrand Local 
Division for an order directing SAA to appoint him as a cabin attendant.190 The 
High Court dismissed Mr Hoffmann’s application191 and he appealed to the 
Constitutional Court against the Witwatersrand Local Division’s dismissal of his 
application.192 
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At the hearing before the Constitutional Court193 (and the Witwatersrand Local 
Division194) four stages of untreated HIV-infection were identified:  
(1) The acute stage, that begins shortly after a person has been infected with  
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus. During this stage the immune system 
of the infected person is depressed, but returns to its normal activity when 
the person recovers. During this period, the person may test to be HIV 
negative, even though the person is infected with the virus.195 
 
(2) In the asymptomatic immunocompetent stage, the person with HIV 
functions normally and is unaware of symptoms of HIV infection. The 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus has not substantially affected the 
person’s immune system at this stage.196 
 
(3) The asymptomatic immunosupressed stage is the stage when the 
amounts of the HI-virus that have gradually destroyed the person’s 
immune system, have increased in the body of the person who is HIV 
positive.  During this stage, the CD 4+ lymphocytes are destroyed by the 
increasing HI-virus in the person’s body and the body cannot replace the 
lymphocytes. At the beginning of the immunosuppressed stage, the CD 4+ 
lymphocyte count drops below 500 cells per microlitre of blood. Only when 
the CD 4+ count drops below 350 cells per microlitre of blood, can the 
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person with HIV not be effectively vaccinated against yellow fever. The 
immune system of the person with HIV is depressed, but the person may 
not show any symptoms of HIV infection or be unaware of the progression 
of the HI-virus in the body.197 
 
(4)  At the stage of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, the immune 
system of the person with HIV has gradually been weakened to such an 
extent that it cannot fight opportunistic infections that the person contracts, 
which can be fatal for such a person.198 
 
The High Court’s approach to whether HIV amounted to a disability 
 
The High Court referred to HIV status as a disability when Hussein J stated that:  
“The respondent’s policy [of not appointing people living with HIV to the positions of cabin 
attendants], in my opinion, is not directed at persons suffering from a disability such as that 
experienced by the applicant”.199  
 
Interestingly enough, after the High Court referred to Mr Hoffmann’s HIV status 
as a “disability”, Hussein J proceeded to determine whether SAA’s policy unfairly 
discriminated against Mr Hoffmann on the basis of HIV and not disability.  
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The approach of the Constitutional Court  
 
Ngwena and Matela state that HIV may amount to a disability, based on both the 
medical and social approaches to disability.200 In terms of the medical approach 
to disability, HIV would amount to a disability if the person living with HIV 
becomes functionally impaired as a result of HIV.201 In terms of the social 
approach, HIV would amount to a disability because it is perceived as such.202 
They state that where HIV is regarded as a “disability” for the purposes of the 
listed grounds in section 9(3) of the Constitution, it would be beneficial for the 
complainant of the discrimination, as the discrimination on this ground would be 
presumed to be unfair and the respondent would have to prove the fairness 
thereof in terms of section 9(5)203 of the Constitution.204 In this regard it is 
submitted that HIV is indeed an analogous ground of discrimination in the 
Constitution, but a listed ground of discrimination in the EEA205 and where 
discrimination on this ground is perpetrated in the employment context, the 
respondent in any event will have to show the fairness thereof.206  
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Before the Constitutional Court, counsel for Mr Hoffmann submitted that HIV 
status constituted a disability for the purpose of the non-discrimination clause in 
the Constitution, because people with HIV were perceived to have a disability, 
even when such persons were able to work.207  
 
The Amicus Curiae in the Hoffmann case, which was the AIDS Law Project at the 
University of Witwatersrand, took the view that HIV status did not constitute a 
disability. The AIDS Law Project submitted that if HIV status was to constitute a 
disability for the purpose of the Constitution, it would bring about problems in the 
future application and interpretation of the EEA,208 that gives effect to the 
Constitution. They held that section 6(1) of the EEA, which deals with unfair 
discrimination in the employment sphere, distinguished between “disability” and 
“HIV status”, because both grounds were included in the provision.209 The EEA 
also distinguished between medical and HIV testing.210 The AIDS Law Project 
also acknowledged that the EEA dealt with affirmative action programmes and 
submitted that if people with HIV fell within the scope of “people with disabilities” 
only for reason of their HIV status, designated employers needed to provide 
affirmative action measures for such persons, irrespective of whether they were 
healthy or not.211 According to them, it was not the intention of the EEA that 
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designated employers should provide affirmative action measures for people with 
HIV who are also healthy.212  
 
The Amicus Curiae submitted that people with HIV who were asymptomatic 
could perform all their duties.213 They also proposed that people with HIV needed 
to be protected from unfair discrimination in the employment context and did not 
need affirmative action measures to support them.214  
 
It is important to note that the AIDS Law Project took a very legalistic approach to 
the issue of why HIV status does not constitute a disability. The Constitutional 
Court itself did not decide on the above matter and stated that it was:  
“ …unnecessary to consider whether [Mr Hoffmann] was discriminated against on a listed ground 
of disability … or whether people who are living with HIV ought not to be regarded as having a 
disability…”215 
  
A person living with HIV does not have to be tested against the requirements of a 
long-term or recurring physical or mental impairment that is substantially limiting, 
to determine whether the individual is as a matter of fact a person with a disability 
in terms of the EEA. A reason for this is that the decision of the highest Court in 
the country not to treat HIV as a disability indicates that the Court at least to 
some extent took cognisance of the AIDS Law Project’s submission that the EEA 
distinguished, amongst others, between HIV and disability as legal grounds of 
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discrimination. These two grounds are therefore not the same. This choice of the 
Constitutional Court also implies that it was not seduced by perceptions that HIV 
status amounts to a disability. The Court’s treatment of HIV as HIV and not as a 
disability, signals that although HIV status may be perceived as a disability, it 
does not as a matter of law constitute a disability.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
It is significant that a definition of “people with disabilities” is found in labour 
legislation. It is even more significant that this legislation (the EEA) seeks to give 
effect to the Constitution’s equality clause in the employment context, because 
the workplace is the one area in which this group experiences marginalisation 
and discrimination and where much emphasis on their “incapabilities” as a group 
is placed.216 
 
Disability is a heterogeneous concept217 and people with disabilities are a 
heterogeneous group, because not all members of the group have the same type 
of impairments. Some members have physical impairments, others sensory 
impairments (which count as physical impairments), some mental impairments 
and others a combination of these impairments.218 The Disability Code 
recognizes the potpourri of people with disabilities and so does the UN Disability 
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Convention, which states that Member States to the Convention must 
acknowledge the diversity of persons with disabilities.219  
 
The Convention also states that Member States must recognize that individual 
autonomy and independence are important for people with disabilities and so is 
their freedom to make their own choices.220  The group must also be afforded the 
opportunity to be actively involved in decision-making processes about policies 
and programmes, including those which directly concern them.221 
“People with disabilities” need to be defined, not only for the purpose of legal 
certainty and in order to distinguish them from other disadvantaged groups, not 
only because their rights and interests require protection and recognition in law 
and not only because reasonable accommodation must be afforded to them, to 
mention but a few reasons. Apart from the abovementioned essential objectives, 
a definition of “people with disabilities” is important for the purpose of affirming 
the human dignity and worth of the group.   
 
Almost any group can define another group who are different from them, by 
assigning characteristics or traits to the other group.222 The question arises 
whether the second group will define itself in the same manner in which it was 
defined by the first group.223 When a particular group, which has suffered past 
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disadvantage as a result of characteristics inherent to the group, has to define 
itself, such a definition is likely to be in line with human dignity rather than a 
definition that another group who are not carriers of the traits, assign to the group 
which has the traits.224  
 
The Labour Court acknowledged that “able-bodied” people are more predisposed 
to labelling people with disabilities as being incapacitated and abnormal.225 When 
people with disabilities defined themselves, when they became “actively involved 
in decision-making processes” (as the UN Disability Convention requires Member 
States to consider) regarding their legal identity, the term “people with 
disabilities” emerged.226  
 
Grogan confirms that the EEA acknowledges “people with disabilities” as one of 
the designated groups. He states that unlike other previously disadvantaged 
groups, people with disabilities “will always be with us”.227 Disability is here to 
stay and a definition of “people with disabilities” must focus on the abilities and 
potential of the group and not the shortcomings of its members. A definition 
should accordingly focus on the members of the group and what they can do 
instead of what they cannot do. Such a definition will affirm the human dignity of 
the members of the group, be in line with the social model of disability and will 
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justify the various legislative protections that are afforded to people with 
disabilities in the workplace.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DISABILITY AND THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
 
3.1.1 The Employment Equity Act 
 
 Section 6(1) of the EEA provides that no person may unfairly discriminate, 
directly or indirectly, against an employee in any employment policy or 
practice,228 on one or more grounds, including disability. The complainant of 
discrimination in the employment context will usually be an employee or job 
applicant, as an “employee” for the purpose of the abovementioned section also 
includes an applicant for employment.229 A worker other than an employee or 
applicant for employment may bring a claim for unfair discrimination in terms of 
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.  
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Section 6(2) of the EEA states that it is not unfair discrimination to take 
affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of the Act,230 or to 
distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement 
of a job.231  
 
Section 11 of the Act provides that, whenever unfair discrimination is alleged in 
terms of the EEA, the employer against whom the allegation is made must 
establish that the discrimination is fair.  
 
The EEA is a statute that was enacted in terms of section 9(4) of the Constitution 
which provides, amongst others, that national legislation must be enacted to 
prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. The purpose of this Act is to achieve 
equity in the workplace.232 One of the means by which this purpose is to be 
accomplished, is by eradicating unfair discrimination so as to promote equal 
opportunity and fair treatment in employment.233  
 
 The prohibition of unfair discrimination in terms of the Act applies to all employers 
and employees (and also applicants for employment).234 Every employer must 
also take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by eliminating 
unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice.235 
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Section 3 of the EEA states that the Act must be interpreted in compliance with 
the Constitution,236 so as to give effect to its purpose (which is to achieve equity 
in the workplace),237 taking into account any relevant code of good practice that 
is issued in terms of the EEA (including the Disability Code) or any other 
employment law,238 and in compliance with the international law obligations of 
the Republic of South Africa, in particular those contained in ILO Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention 111 of 1958.239  
 
Two of the “international law obligations” of the Republic that must be complied 
with when the EEA is interpreted with regard to disability discrimination, are 
those contained in the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention 111 of 1958 and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, which will be discussed below.  
 
3.1.2 The ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 
111 of 1958 
 
Article 1(1) of the abovementioned Convention (hereinafter “Convention 111”) 
provides that “discrimination”, for its purposes, includes:  
“(a) any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, 
sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which 
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has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment 
in employment or occupation  
 
(b)  such other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment 
or occupation as may be determined by the Member [State] concerned 
after consultation with representative employers’ and workers’ 
organisations,  where such exist, and with other appropriate bodies.“ 
 
Article 1(3) states that “employment” and “occupation” include access to 
vocational training, access to employment and to particular occupations and also 
terms and conditions of employment.  
 
Article 1(2) of the Convention provides that any distinction, exclusion or 
preference in respect of a particular job, based on the inherent requirements 
thereof, shall not be regarded as (unfair) discrimination. This is known as the 
inherent job requirement defence to a claim of unfair discrimination, which is also 
contained in section 6(2)(b) of the EEA.  
 
Article 2 of the Convention states that every Member State for which Convention 
111 is in force (one of which is the Republic of South Africa), must undertake to 
declare and pursue, by means which are appropriate to the Member State’s 
national conditions and practice, a national policy that is designed to promote 
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equality of opportunity in employment and the elimination of discrimination in 
employment and occupation.  
   
3.1.3 The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  
(hereinafter “the UN Disability Convention”)  
 
The UN Disability Convention provides that Member States to the Convention 
must reaffirm the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Member States must guarantee 
the need of persons with disabilities to fully enjoy the abovementioned rights and 
freedoms without discrimination.240 
 
The Convention also provides that Member States must acknowledge that 
discrimination against any person with a disability is a violation of the inherent 
dignity and worth of the human person.241 
 
Article 2 provides that “‘discrimination on the basis of disability’ means any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the 
purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, 
on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms 
of discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation.” 
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Article 4(1) provides that Member States to the Convention must undertake to 
ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all persons with disabilities, without discrimination of any kind on the 
basis of disability and must undertake, inter alia, to:  
• adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights that the Convention recognizes,242  
• take all appropriate measures to change or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices that amount to discrimination against 
persons with disabilities,243  
• take into account the protection and promotion of human rights of persons 
with disabilities in all State policies or programmes,244  
• refrain from engaging in any act or practice that is in conflict with the UN 
Disability Convention and ensure that its public authorities and institutions 
also adhere to the Convention,245 and  
• take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination on the basis of 
disability by any person, organization or private enterprise.246  
 
Article 5(1) of the UN Disability Convention provides that Member States must 
acknowledge that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal 
protection and benefit of the law. Member States must also prohibit all 
discrimination on the basis of disability and must guarantee that persons with 
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disabilities will enjoy equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on 
all grounds.247  
 
Article 27(1) states that Member States must acknowledge the rights of persons 
with disabilities to work on an equal basis with others. This right includes the right 
to the opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen or accepted in a labour 
market and a work environment that is open, inclusive and accessible to persons 
with disabilities. Member States must safeguard and promote the realization of 
the right to work, including for persons who acquire a disability during the course 
of employment, by taking appropriate steps, including legislative steps, to inter 
alia prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability with regard to all matters 
concerning all forms of employment, including conditions of recruitment, hiring 
and employment, continuance of employment, career advancement and safe and 
healthy working conditions.248  
 
3.2 Proving unfair discrimination on the basis of disability under the 
EEA  
 
The principles pertaining to proving a claim of unfair discrimination on the basis 
of disability will now be discussed. Reference to the case of Hoffmann v SAA249 
will be made throughout to illustrate the application of these principles, even 
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though this case dealt with unfair discrimination on the basis of HIV and not 
disability, and was decided under the Constitution and not the EEA.  
 
3.2.1 Discrimination 
  
Neither the Constitution250 nor the EEA contains a definition of “discrimination”, 
but Convention 111 contains such a definition, as stated above, that must be 
followed when discrimination under the EEA is interpreted.251 “Discrimination” 
under Convention 111 must be interpreted as “unfair discrimination” for the 
purposes of the EEA.252 In Hoffmann v SAA, the Constitutional Court also 
referred to South Africa’s international law obligations under Convention 111, to 
outlaw and prohibit unfair discrimination in employment253 and stated that unfair 
discrimination against a person diminishes the person’s human dignity.254   
 
Section 6(1) of the EEA prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination. 
Discrimination against an employee or applicant for employment is direct when 
the reason for the discrimination is clear.255 The appellant in Hoffmann was able 
to prove that he was not appointed to the position of cabin attendant in terms of 
SAA’s employment practice, for the clear reason of his HIV status.256   
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The employee or job applicant who wishes to establish direct discrimination on 
the basis of disability must show, on a balance of probabilities, that there was 
differential treatment in respect of him or her in terms of the definition of 
“discrimination” contained in Convention 111, for which the reason was the 
person’s disability, which diminishes his or her human dignity.257  
  
Discrimination is indirect when a prima facie neutral yardstick is applied in the 
workplace, which has an adverse effect on a group of people in this area that can 
be identified in terms of a listed or unlisted prohibited ground in the EEA and 
objective criteria in the workplace cannot justify the application of the yardstick 
mentioned.258 The employee or job applicant, who wishes to prove indirect 
discrimination on the basis of disability, must show that he or she belongs to a 
group of people who fall within one of the grounds in section 6(1) of the EEA,259 
who are people who have disabilities. The complainant must also show an 
employment policy or practice that is prima facie neutral, but which, in its 
application, discriminates and adversely affects a disproportionate number of 
persons who have disabilities, the application thereof which cannot be justified.260   
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3.2.2 Causation 
 
The complainant who alleges unfair discrimination on the basis of disability must, 
on the basis of evidence, also prove that his or her disability was the ground, 
reason or cause of the differential treatment to which he or she had been 
subjected.261 The employee or job applicant must show that the respondent had 
knowledge of the former’s disability and that this knowledge prompted or caused 
the adverse treatment towards the person, and not merely that the disability of 
the complainant coincided with the adverse treatment.262 In Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 
v Whitehead,263 Zondo AJP (as he then was) stated that the respondent, who 
alleged unfair discrimination on the ground of pregnancy, could not show on the 
basis of evidence that she would have been appointed to the post of human 
resources generalist had it not been for her pregnancy.264 There was accordingly 
no nexus between her pregnancy and her non–appointment.265 Willis JA 
confirmed that there is no connection between a prohibited ground of 
discrimination and adverse treatment a person suffers, if the prohibited ground 
did not cause the adverse treatment against the person.266  
 
                                                 
261 Ibid 586 
262 Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm [2008] UKHL 43. In  
     Raol Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Thekwini Toyota v Madlala (2008) 29 ILJ 267 (SCA), our  own 
     Supreme Court of Appeal stated at 270 that a court should be cautious to conclude that 
     discrimination on a prohibited ground (in this instance, race) was present merely because 
     differentiation between two employees coincided with the prohibited ground.         
263 (2000) 21 ILJ 571 (LAC) 
264 Supra 580 
265 Ibid 
266 Ibid 591–592  
 54
The Labour Appeal Court laid down a test for causation in SA Chemical Workers’ 
Union and others v Afrox Ltd,267 which requires a court to investigate both factual 
and legal causation to determine whether a prohibited reason for dismissal was a 
reason or cause for dismissal.268 This test was followed and applied with 
approval in a number of Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court decisions.269 If 
the Afrox test is adapted in respect of a discrimination claim, to determine 
whether the prohibited ground of disability is the reason for discrimination against 
an employee or job applicant, the adaptation will be as follows:  
 
1. To determine factual causation, a court must firstly ascertain whether “but 
for” the disability of the complainant, the person would have been 
subjected to discrimination.270 
 
• If the court finds that the complainant would have been discriminated 
against even if he or she had been an “able–bodied” person, the 
complainant’s disability is not the factual cause of the discrimination.271   
 
• If the court finds that the complainant would not have been discriminated 
against had he or she been an “able–bodied” person, the person’s 
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disability is the factual cause of the discrimination and the court needs to 
investigate legal causation.272 
 
2. To determine legal causation, the court must secondly ascertain whether 
the disability of the complainant is the “most probable inference” it can 
draw from the facts and circumstances surrounding the discrimination 
against the person, in that disability was the “main”, “dominant”, 
“proximate” or “most likely” cause of the discrimination.273 Even if the 
complainant’s disability was not the principal cause of the discrimination, a 
court will still find that it was the cause thereof if it “played a significant 
role”274 in the discrimination against the person.  
 
If a court finds that the disability of the complainant was both the factual and legal 
causes of the discrimination, disability will be the cause or reason for the 
discrimination against the person.275   
 
3.2.3 Defences by the employer  
 
If it is established that the complainant’s disability was the reason for the 
discrimination against the person, the discrimination is on a prohibited ground, 
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which will render it unfair.276 The employer may, however, show that its actions 
were not unfair with reference to an inherent requirement of a job, which is one of 
the instances in which discrimination will not be unfair.277  
 
In Hoffmann v SAA, the airline had justified its employment practice on the basis 
of commercial rationale and public perceptions, amongst others, which the High 
Court accepted as legitimate justifications,278 but which the Constitutional Court 
rejected. The Constitutional Court stated that SAA’s commercial requirements of 
ensuring the health and safety of its passengers were important, but so was 
protecting people with HIV from prejudice279 and “[p]rejudice can never justify 
unfair discrimination.”280 Ngcobo J further stated that public perceptions and 
practices of foreign airlines also could not govern the constitutional right to 
equality.281 
 
From the abovementioned case, it is clear that public perception, prejudice, 
commercial rationale and foreign discriminatory practices cannot operate as 
defences to discrimination in the employment context, but an inherent 
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requirement of the job however may render discrimination in this context not to 
be unfair. Hoffmann v SAA illustrates what may amount to an inherent 
requirement of a job for the purposes of the EEA.   
 
The High Court in Hoffmann stated that it was an inherent job requirement, “at 
least for the moment”, for a person to be HIV negative for the position of cabin 
attendant.282   
 
Before the Constitutional Court, the AIDS Law Project, who was an amicus 
curiae in the case, submitted that it was an inherent job requirement for a cabin 
attendant to be able to be vaccinated against yellow fever, rather than be HIV 
negative.283 Ngcobo J stated that SAA’s own medical evidence brought before 
the Court – which indicated that only people who have reached the 
immunosuppressed stage of HIV infection and whose CD 4+ lymphocyte count 
has dropped below 350 cells per microlitre of blood could not be immunized or 
were prone to contracting infections, but not all people with HIV284 – did not 
support the High Court’s finding that it was an inherent requirement for a person 
to be HIV negative for the position of cabin attendant.285  
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Medical evidence indicated that Hoffmann’s CD 4+ lymphocyte count was 469 
cells per microlitre of blood.286 He could indeed be vaccinated against yellow 
fever, was asymptomatic and not prone to opportunistic infections, and a suitable 
candidate for the position of cabin attendant.287 Hoffmann could accordingly 
perform duties as a cabin attendant on flights over yellow fever endemic 
countries.  
 
The Constitutional Court judgment implies that people living with HIV who have 
reached the immunosuppressed stage of HIV infection and whose CD 4+ 
lymphocyte count is below 350 cells per microlitre of blood and cannot be 
vaccinated against yellow fever, cannot be appointed as cabin attendants, 
because of the inherent requirements of the job. Indeed, the Court stated that the 
safety, health and operational considerations upon which SAA’s employment 
practice was premised – and in terms of which people with HIV were not 
appointed as cabin attendants because they could not effectively be vaccinated 
against yellow fever,288 amongst others – did not apply to all people with HIV, but 
only to those mentioned who could not effectively be vaccinated against yellow 
fever.289  
 
 
 
                                                 
286 Ibid 2379  
287 Ibid 
288 Hoffmann (High Court) 898  
289 Hoffmann (Constitutional Court) 2371  
 59
3.2.3.1 The inherent requirement of a job as a defence to unfair 
discrimination  
 
It is not unfair discrimination to distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the 
basis of an inherent requirement of a job.290 According to Du Toit et al, the 
abovementioned distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a person 
constitutes differential treatment, but does not amount to unfair discrimination291 
or fair discrimination.292 Grogan states that the defence of an inherent 
requirement of a job acknowledges that a person under certain circumstances 
needs to possess or lack a trait that falls in the prohibited grounds of unfair 
discrimination in the EEA, in respect of a job, which must relate to a proven 
inherent requirement of a job.293 The job applicant or employee must accordingly 
possess or lack a trait to meet an inherent requirement of a job, in which event 
differential treatment on this basis will not amount to unfair discrimination against 
the person affected by the proven inherent requirement of a job.294 Emphasis is 
placed on the word “proven”, because an employer who wishes to rely on an 
inherent requirement of a job as a defence to unfair discrimination on a prohibited 
ground, needs to prove that the defence is applicable.295 An “inherent 
requirement of a job” needs to be narrowly interpreted as distinction, exclusion or 
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preference of any person on this basis is an exception to the principle of non–
discrimination.296 
 
In Swart v Mr Video (Pty) Ltd297 a 28 year old applicant applied for a position of a 
shop assistant, who had to be under the age of 25 years, in terms of the 
respondent’s advertisement. The respondent refused to appoint the applicant to 
the position, because she did not comply with the age requirement in the 
advertisement.  The respondent averred that the age requirement was for the 
purpose of ensuring compatibility amongst its employees and an “older” 
employee might be reluctant to accept instructions from his or her younger 
colleagues.298 The Commissioner held that the respondent had unfairly 
discriminated against the applicant on the basis of age, marital status and family 
responsibility and that discrimination may be justified if based upon the inherent 
requirements of the job, but none were in question.299 The respondent also had 
to use a different yardstick than age to measure compatibility and had to employ 
an applicant who was willing to perform the job and not unwilling to take 
instructions from younger colleagues.300  
 
The Labour Court, in Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd,301 defined the term 
“inherent requirement of the job”. The respondent offered the applicant a position 
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as human resource generalist on a permanent basis. After having learned that 
the applicant was pregnant, the respondent offered her a fixed–term contract. Ms 
Whitehead brought a claim of unfair discrimination on the basis of pregnancy 
before the Labour Court.302 The respondent conceded that it had discriminated 
against the applicant, but that the discrimination was based on an inherent job 
requirement of “uninterrupted job continuity”, which rendered the discrimination 
against her not to be unfair.303 In essence, the employer discriminated against 
the applicant on the basis of pregnancy, but stated that, due to her pregnancy, 
she will not be able to meet the alleged inherent job requirement of 
“uninterrupted job continuity”, which rendered its discrimination on this basis not 
to be unfair.  
 
The Labour Court stated that “an inherent requirement of the particular job” 
meant that the job itself had to have “some indispensable attribute”… [that had 
to] relate in an inescapable way to the performing of the job required”.304 An 
inherent requirement of a job also had to be so inherent that an applicant would 
not be eligible for a position in question if the person is unable to fulfil that 
requirement.305 The “indispensable attribute” that an employer relies upon as an 
inherent requirement of a job had to be connected to the job and where a job 
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could be performed without the requirement, such would not constitute an 
inherent job requirement.306  
 
The court found that the requirement of uninterrupted job continuity was arbitrary 
and unreasonable, and that no job applicant could guarantee uninterrupted job 
continuity for twelve months or for any period.307 In deciding whether the 
requirement of uninterrupted job continuity was commercially justifiable, the 
Labour Court held that a Bill of Rights would not be required, where commercial 
reasons could determine whether discrimination (in this case, on the basis of 
pregnancy) is fair or unfair.308 The respondent discriminated against the applicant 
on the basis of a job requirement that was not an inherent requirement of the job. 
This constituted unfair discrimination against the applicant.309   
 
The applicant in Public Servants’ Association on behalf of Louw v Department of 
Roads, Transport and Public Works310 was a general assistant in a traffic 
department, who applied for the position of Provincial Manager in the 
department. The requirements of the position were the possession of a Grade 10 
certificate and Code 8 driver’s licence and the undergoing of a training 
programme.311 The applicant was not in possession of a Grade 10 certificate, but 
had enrolled for a similar qualification, which he had not yet completed.312 He 
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was not appointed to the position of Provincial Manager and alleged an unfair 
labour practice because he had not been promoted.313 
  
The respondent argued that the possession of a Grade 10 qualification was an 
inherent requirement of the job of Provincial Manager and that the integrity of the 
traffic profession would be compromised when people who did not fulfil that 
requirement, were allowed to enter the profession.314 Moreover, a person could 
only be appointed as a traffic officer when a Traffic Diploma is acquired from a 
Traffic College and only enter such institution on a Grade 10 or equivalent 
qualification.315  
 
The Commissioner found that a Grade 10 or equivalent qualification was an 
inherent requirement of the job of the traffic profession, because traffic officials 
were professionals and their positions required a higher educational 
qualification.316 If a person with a lower educational level than that of Grade 10 or 
its equivalent were allowed to enter such positions, it would ridicule the Traffic 
Diploma and compromise the integrity of the job.317 The applicant did not meet 
the inherent requirement of the job and no unfair labour practice was committed 
in respect of him.318  
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Dlamini and others v Green Four Security319 was decided in the context of 
dismissal, in which the Labour Court also had to determine the validity of an 
inherent job requirement an employer claimed. The applicants were security 
guards and members of the Baptised Nazareth Group whose faith prohibited 
them from trimming their beards.320 The employer had a workplace rule in place 
that required security guards to be clean shaven.321 It issued the applicants with 
final warnings for being unshaven on duty and later dismissed them.322 The 
applicants argued that the rule unfairly discriminated against them on the basis of 
religion and that their dismissals were automatically unfair.323 The court 
confirmed that the respondent had to prove that the rule to be clean shaven was 
in place and that it was an inherent requirement of the job.324  
  
The Labour Court considered the Dress Orders in the South African National 
Defence Force and the South African Police Service to determine whether the 
employer’s workplace rule was an inherent requirement of the job.325 The reason 
for shaven beards in terms of the Dress Orders was neatness,326 and the 
workplace rule also sought to achieve this objective and to portray the image of 
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the security company.327 The workplace rule was an inherent requirement of the 
job of security guards.328  
 
In Wallace v Du Toit,329 the applicant was an au pair to the two children of the 
respondent and his wife. She was unmarried and had no children when she 
started working as a child minder for the respondent. Two years after she 
commenced employment, she became pregnant and the respondent dismissed 
her.330 The applicant approached the Labour Court and claimed compensation 
for an automatically unfair discrimination based on pregnancy and damages for 
unfair discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.331 
 
The Labour Court held that the applicant’s dismissal was automatically unfair,332 
because her employment was terminated solely because she fell pregnant.333 
The respondent argued that he had terminated the applicant’s employment, 
because it was an inherent requirement of the job of a child minder not to have 
children, nor to be pregnant.334 The court found that this was not an inherent 
requirement of the job and that there was unfair discrimination against the 
applicant on the ground of pregnancy.335 The respondent acted unfairly towards 
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the applicant when he failed to determine whether she could still perform her job 
as a child minder even though she was pregnant.336  
 
In IMATU and another v City of Cape Town,337 Murdoch, the second applicant, 
who was a person living with insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, applied for a 
position as a firefighter and was not appointed in terms of the respondent’s 
employment practice.338 The City of Cape Town stated that it was an inherent 
requirement of the job of a firefighter to not expose himself, his colleagues or the 
public to a “real risk of harm to [the public’s and his colleagues’] or [his] own 
safety.”339 To meet the abovementioned inherent requirement, the particular fire 
fighter also had not to be at risk of suffering a severe hypoglycaemic attack340 
and had not to be living with type I diabetes. The respondent argued that every 
person with type I diabetes was prone to severe hypoglycaemic attacks and that 
the inherent job requirements of the position of firefighter justified the exclusion of 
such persons in terms of its blanket employment ban.341 It relied on the inherent 
requirement of a job to defend its discriminatory conduct in respect of Murdoch 
as a type I diabetic.342 
  
The Labour Court stated that the test for an inherent job requirement is whether 
the inherent requirements are so as to justify the discrimination and referred to 
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the Australian case of X v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 63.343 In the 
aforementioned case, a soldier who was living with HIV was dismissed because 
he could not meet the inherent requirements of the job, which, according to the 
Commonwealth, was the ability to bleed safely.344  The Labour Court adopted the 
High Court of Australia’s approach that a court should not determine whether the 
degree of risk that flows from a medical condition is an inherent requirement of a 
job, but rather whether the degree of risk from a medical condition (in Murdoch’s 
case, a severe hypoglycaemic attack flowing from type I diabetes) is relevant in 
assessing whether the person living with such condition can meet the inherent 
requirements of a job.345 Grogan states that employers, who claim that job 
applicants and employees living with a medical condition create a danger as a 
result of risk attached to such medical condition, must prove to the satisfaction of 
a court that the specific individual in question is prone to such risk and not that 
persons living with that medical condition are prone to the risk in general.346 
 
The court held that the degree of risk of a debilitating hypoglycaemic attack in the 
case of Murdoch was insignificant347 and accordingly irrelevant. The medical 
evidence that was put forward by the applicant’s physician, who was “a leader in 
the field”348 of diabetes, suggested that Murdoch was a fit person whose diabetes 
was well controlled. Even though Murdoch was a type I diabetic, he did not 
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experience a debilitating hypoglycaemic attack during his thirteen years of 
fighting fires on a voluntary basis.349 Murphy AJ stated that a minimal risk of a 
hypoglycaemic attack, which was the case with Murdoch, should not preclude 
him from performing the inherent requirement of the job of firefighter (which was 
not to pose a threat to the safety of oneself or others while carrying out duties) 
and it could not justify imposing a blanket ban on the employment of persons with 
diabetes as firefighters. 350  
 
Du Toit et al state that an inherent requirement of a job, upon which basis 
distinction, exclusion or preference of a person will not amount to unfair 
discrimination, must be a permanent attribute of the particular job that must be 
inherent to the job and necessary to perform the work that is attached to the 
particular job.351  
 
3.2.3.2  The inherent requirements and essential functions of a job  
 
The Disability Code provides that “[t]he ‘inherent requirements of the job’ are 
those requirements the employer stipulates as necessary for a person to be 
appointed to a job, and are necessary in order to enable an employee to perform 
the essential functions of the job”.352 Ngwena and Pretorius state that the 
“essential functions” of a job are an even stricter interpretation of the “inherent 
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requirements of a job”353 (which must itself be strictly interpreted). The “essential 
functions of a job” aim to remove functions that are not essential to performing a 
job, from the ambit of the inherent requirements of the particular job.354 It also 
requires the employer to base the decision to appoint a suitably qualified person 
to a particular job on a practical (objective) evaluation of what the particular job 
requires and not only on the employer’s (subjective) judgment.355 An employer 
needs to differentiate between essential and non–essential functions of a 
particular job.356 People with disabilities only need to perform the essential 
functions of a job357 and cannot be excluded from employment on the basis of 
non–essential tasks.358   
 
3.2.4 IMATU and another v City of Cape Town 
 
This is the first South African case in which a claim of unfair discrimination on the 
basis of disability was brought under the EEA. Murdoch was a law enforcement 
officer who was employed by the Municipality of the City of Cape Town. He also 
performed service as a volunteer firefighter.359 He applied for the position of 
firefighter and passed a recruitment interview as well as physical tests that he 
undertook.360 
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The physician who was employed by the City of Cape Town, found that Murdoch 
was medically unfit for the position of firefighter because the latter had insulin 
dependent diabetes mellitus.361 The respondent had a blanket ban in place 
whereby people living with this medical condition were not appointed to the 
positions of firefighters362 and Murdoch was for reason of his type I diabetes, 
accordingly not appointed as a firefighter in terms of the respondent’s blanket 
ban.  
 
IMATU alleged that the City of Cape Town, through its blanket ban, unfairly 
discriminated against Murdoch on the basis of disability or, alternatively, on the 
analogous ground of his medical condition, which was type I diabetes.363 The 
Labour Court had to determine whether the respondent’s blanket ban constituted 
unfair discrimination364 against Murdoch in terms of the EEA. It applied the 
Harksen v Lane365 test to determine the issue.366   
 
The Labour Court’s application of the Harksen v Lane inquiry:  
 
(a) The court, firstly, had to determine whether the respondent’s employment 
practice differentiated between people or categories of people.367  
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The City of Cape Town admitted that it had differentiated between Murdoch and 
other applicants for positions of firefighter, by refusing, in terms of the blanket 
ban, to transfer him to such position because he was living with type I 
diabetes.368 The respondent’s rationale for doing so was that it had to provide fire 
protection services as a municipality under the Constitution369 and had to take 
legislative measures370 to ensure a safe working environment to its employees 
and third parties.371 The respondent also had to take steps to guard against 
reasonably foreseeable harm to its employees and third parties.372  
 
The court found that there was a link between the differential treatment of 
Murdoch in terms of the blanket ban and the legitimate purpose of ensuring 
public safety.373 This rationality constituted “mere differentiation” and section 9(1) 
of the Constitution was not infringed upon.374   
 
(b) The court, secondly, had to determine whether the differentiation in 
respect of Murdoch amounted to unfair discrimination.375  
 
The court had to determine whether the differential treatment in respect of 
Murdoch was based on a listed ground.376 Murphy AJ held that diabetes mellitus  
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does not constitute a disability and that the respondent’s blanket ban, 
accordingly, did not differentiate on a listed ground.377  
 
The judge held that type I diabetes, however, was an analogous ground of 
discrimination, because it was an attribute that Murdoch possessed that had an 
adverse effect on his human dignity.378 The exclusion of people with diabetes 
from employment on the basis of outdated assumptions as to this attribute had 
an adverse affect on the human dignity of a person living with it.379 The 
respondent’s blanket ban discriminated against Murdoch on the unlisted ground 
of type I diabetes.380  
 
The court considered the Harksen v Lane factors to determine whether the 
blanket ban perpetrated unfair discrimination:381 
 
The position of the complainant in society and whether the complainant has 
suffered from past patterns of disadvantage:382 
 
The court held that people with type I diabetes are excluded from jobs and 
discouraged to pursue professions due to the attribute they are living with and 
erroneous perceptions that exist about type I diabetes. 383 
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The nature of the provision of power and the purpose it sought to achieve:384 
 
The respondent’s employment practice and the reason for its existence, which 
was to reduce risks to firefighters and third parties, was based on incorrect 
assumptions about people living with Type I diabetes.385 Medical evidence, which 
the City of Cape Town did not consider, showed that not all people with type I 
diabetes were prone to debilitating hypoglycaemic attacks.386  
 
The extent to which the discrimination had affected the rights or interests of the 
complainant:387 
 
Murphy AJ held that the blanket ban was not custom–made to give effect to the 
purpose of public safety and it curbed Murdoch’s rights more than which was 
needed.388 The ban constituted an “overreach”389 and such ban, and the 
application thereof, amounted to unfair discrimination against Murdoch.390 It 
regarded all people with type I diabetes as being at risk of having severe 
hypoglycaemic attacks – and accordingly unfit to be appointed as firefighters –
regardless of whether a specific individual living with the medical condition 
exhibits that risk, which was not the case with Murdoch.391 The respondent failed 
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to acknowledge that Murdoch “[lived] a normal life apart from his medication 
regime”392 and that he was otherwise a healthy individual.393 Murdoch also had 
good vision394 and no complications that arose from his diabetes.395 
 
The City of Cape Town had to show that the discrimination was fair in terms of 
the EEA396 and not the Constitution’s limitations clause, because the applicants 
claimed unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA and not the Constitution.397 This 
approach of the Labour Court was in line with the principle laid down in the later 
Constitutional Court case of Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks SA 
(Pty) Ltd and Others (Treatment Action Campaign and Innovative Medicines SA 
as Amici Curiae)398 In casu, Ngcobo J stated that where the Constitution imposed 
a duty on the Legislature to enact legislation to give effect to a right in the 
Constitution and where Parliament had done so, a person had to found a claim in 
terms of the “subordinate” Parliamentary legislation and not on the right in the 
Constitution from which the legislation originates.399  Where a person founded a 
claim on the legislation, a court had to decide the matter in terms of the 
“subordinate” legislation and not the Constitution. 400 
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The court found that the respondent’s defence of excluding Murdoch on the basis 
of an inherent requirement of the job failed and its unfair discrimination against 
Murdoch could not be justified.401 Murphy AJ also referred to the Constitutional 
Court case of Hoffmann v SAA, which confirmed that differentiation amongst 
persons on the basis of a medical – or health condition, called upon an individual 
assessment in respect of a person living with the condition, instead of a blanket 
exclusion of such persons from employment. 402       
 
The Labour Court declared the respondent’s blanket ban, as well as its failure to 
transfer Murdoch from the position of law enforcement officer to firefighter, to be 
unfair discrimination.403 The court ordered the City of Cape Town to conduct an 
individual assessment on own merits or objective criteria, in respect of every 
applicant for the post of firefighter404 and to second Murdoch in the position of 
learner firefighter for a Firefighter I Training Course.405 
 
Grogan states that IMATU, which endorsed Hoffmann by preferring individual 
assessments over blanket employment exclusions when it comes to 
differentiation on the basis of a medical condition, did not send the message 
across that blanket exclusions will never pass constitutional muster, but that 
individual assessments will be the fairer alternative.406 A blanket employment ban 
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must be premised on an unadulterated and scientifically proven link between a 
specific medical condition and the ability to perform a job.407 Even if such link is 
established, the ban itself must still yield to fairness in order to pass constitutional 
muster.408  
 
The respondent in Hoffmann could not establish such a proven link between HIV, 
an inability to be effectively vaccinated against yellow fever and the inability to 
perform the duties of a cabin attendant, in respect of its blanket ban, upon which 
the Constitutional Court stated that: 
“[SAA’s employment] practice, therefore, judged and treated all persons who are living with HIV 
on the same basis. It judged all of them to be unfit for employment as cabin attendants on the 
basis of assumptions that are true only for an identifiable group of people who have HIV.”409 
 
Nor could the respondent in IMATU establish this link between type I diabetes, a 
predisposition to debilitating hypoglycaemic attacks and the incapability to 
perform the duties of a firefighter, in respect of its blanket ban, whereupon the 
Labour Court responded that:  
“[The City of Cape Town] is treating all insulin dependent diabetics the same and imposing a 
blanket ban on the employment of that group as fire–fighters, irrespective of whether the 
particular individual – such as Murdoch, who is physically fit and in optimal control of his diabetes 
– displays any susceptibility to uncontrolled hypoglycaemic episodes.” 410  
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3.3 Conclusion 
 
Even though IMATU and another v City of Cape Town did not deal with 
discrimination on the basis of disability under the EEA, it dealt with the entire 
spectrum on how discrimination on the basis of disability ought to be 
approached.411 The case dealt with extensive medical evidence of a medical 
condition that was argued to be a disability, until the Labour Court found 
otherwise. It also dealt in detail with the issues of discrimination, the unfairness of 
the discrimination and the validity of the employer’s defence to it.412 A prominent 
feature of the IMATU decision, as stated above, was the Labour Court’s 
dissatisfaction with a blanket employment that was linked to legitimate purposes 
and seemed to protect valid interests, but which unfairly discriminated against a 
person on the basis of a medical condition. The situation is aggravated when the 
ban is premised on generalised erroneous perceptions such as that all people 
with insulin dependent diabetes mellitus are prone to severe hypoglycaemic 
attacks. Fortunately, the Labour Court in IMATU (and the Constitutional Court in 
Hoffmann), has welcomed individual assessments in respect of differentiation 
based on a medical condition.   
 
An individual assessment plays an important role in not only in respect of a 
medical condition, but also disability. It provides an employee or job applicant 
with a disability, or other medical condition, with some form of “audi alterem 
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partem” in respect of an employment position. According to the Constitutional 
Court, “[p]rejudice can never justify unfair discrimination”.413 An individualised 
assessment provides an opportunity to such an employee or job applicant to 
answer to and counter any prejudices the employer may have in respect of the 
person’s disability or other medical condition. It may assist the employer to not 
discriminate against the person based on prejudices or perceptions as to the 
person’s disability or medical condition. Moreover, it may also serve as a 
measure of reasonable accommodation, because once the employer has 
individually assessed the person’s disability or other medical condition, the 
employer can make the appropriate and required adjustments to reasonably 
accommodate, where necessary, the needs of such employee or job applicant.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
 
4.1 The origin of reasonable accommodation in respect of people with 
disabilities  
 
“Where a rule or a practice makes generalizations about people solely on the basis of disability 
without regard to the particular circumstances of the specific class of individuals affected, then 
this is, in my view, entirely unfair to the individuals. Moreover, in order for there to be true 
individualization, a close assessment should be made of the individual in question since even 
persons with the same disability vary markedly in how they personally function and cope with 
their affliction, or vary in the degree of impairment because of different stages of their infirmity. I 
concede that this method may make matters somewhat burdensome for the employers. However, 
this is a small price to pay for the high value society has placed on the rights of disabled 
persons.”414 
 
As was stated in an earlier Chapter, the South African definition of “people with 
disabilities” is to a large extent premised on the social model of disability. 
According to the social model, disability is something that society creates, rather 
than something that exists.415 In this regard, the White Paper on Integrated 
National Disability Strategy provides that:  
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“It is the stairs leading into a building that disable the wheelchair user rather than the wheelchair. 
It is defects in the design of everyday equipment that cause difficulties, not the abilities of people 
using it. 
It is society’s lack of skill in using and accepting alternative ways to communicate that excludes 
people with communication disabilities. 
It is the inability of ordinary schools to deal with diversity in the classroom that forces children with 
disabilities into special schools”416  
 
In terms of the social model of disability, “able–bodied” society must change itself 
to cater to the needs of people with disabilities and these changes must seek to 
reasonably accommodate people with disabilities.417  
 
The EEA defines “reasonable accommodation” as “any modification or 
adjustment to a job or to the working environment that will enable a person from 
a designated group to have access to or participate or advance in 
employment”.418 The “designated groups” who are beneficiaries under affirmative 
action measures419 are black people, women and people with disabilities.420 
Section 15(2)(c) of the EEA also states that affirmative action measures taken by 
a designated employer421 must include providing reasonable accommodation for 
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people from the designated groups (which include people with disabilities) to 
ensure that such persons enjoy equal opportunities and are equitably 
represented in the workplace of the designated employer.   
 
Reasonable accommodation is a constitutional principle and a tool to achieve 
substantive equality.422 It flows from section 9(2) of the Constitution, which 
provides that “[e]quality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”   
 
The abovementioned constitutional provision is also the origin of affirmative 
action measures. Item 6.1 of the Technical Assistance Guidelines on the 
Employment of People with Disabilities, states that reasonable accommodation, 
however, is not only an affirmative action measure, but also a non–discrimination 
principle.423 In such an instance, it is also a manifestation of sections 9(3) and 
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9(4) of the Constitution, which respectively prohibits both the State and persons 
from directly or indirectly unfairly discriminating against anyone on the basis of 
disability.  
 
4.2 The Code of Good Practice on the Employment of People with 
Disabilities  
 
The Disability Code provides that employers should reasonably accommodate 
people with disabilities and that the purpose of such accommodation is to 
minimize the effect of the particular person’s disability on the ability of the person 
to fulfil the essential functions of a job.424  
 
The employer must implement the most cost–effective measure of 
accommodating the employee or job applicant with a disability, which must 
eliminate the impediments the particular person in employment faces and enable 
the person to benefit from employment on an equal basis with others.425 The 
abovementioned provision contains the requirements of reasonable 
accommodation for people with disabilities: that the accommodation must enable 
a person with a disability to enter a job for which the person is suitably 
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qualified,426 that it must enable the person to advance in existing employment427  
and that it be cost–effective in giving effect to the abovementioned two 
requirements.428    
 
The Technical Assistance Guidelines state that an employer is not under a duty 
to employ a person with a disability where the particular person cannot perform 
the essential functions of a job even with reasonable accommodation.429 In such 
a case, the employer is not obliged to create a new job for the person for the 
purpose of reasonably accommodating the person, nor must the employer re-
assign the essential functions of the job to another employee. 430 Where a job– 
applicant or employee with a disability is, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, able to fulfil the essential functions of a particular job, an 
employer may restructure that job for the person with a disability by re–assigning 
peripheral job functions to another employee.431 
 
Employers who need to reasonably accommodate an employee or job applicant 
with a disability, need to pay for such accommodation, unless it imposes an 
unjustifiable hardship on the business of the employer.432  
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Job applicants and employees with disabilities, who are suitably qualified for the 
job, need to be reasonably accommodated.433 Such persons may require it 
during the recruitment and selection processes, in the working environment, the 
way work is usually performed, evaluated or rewarded and in benefits and 
privileges attached to employment.434 An employer accordingly needs to provide 
reasonable accommodation to a suitably qualified person with a disability even 
before the person is appointed.435 An employer must also accommodate 
employees with disabilities whose work, working environment or impairment 
changes to such an extent that it may have an effect on the capacity of the 
person to fulfil the essential functions of the job.436     
 
The employer has a duty to reasonably accommodate a job applicant or 
employee with a disability when the person voluntarily discloses a need for 
accommodation of a disability or where a need for accommodation of the 
person’s disability is patently obvious to the employer.437 An employer may only 
request specific information on the particular type of accommodation the person 
requires after the employer has determined that the job applicant is suitably 
qualified for the position and has made a conditional job offer to the applicant.438 
If the employer discusses a particular accommodation need prior to a conditional 
job offer has been made and the applicant is not offered the job, it may indicate 
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unwillingness on the part of the employer to provide the requested 
accommodation, which courts may perceive as disability discrimination.439    
 
The employer and employee with a disability must consult with each other and, 
where it is needed, also with technical experts, to determine measures by which 
the person with a disability can be reasonably accommodated.440 The Technical 
Assistance Guidelines provide that the employer and the particular employee in 
need of reasonable accommodation must consult with each other and jointly 
identify and establish the particular accommodation the employee needs to meet 
the inherent requirements of the job in which the person is employed.441 
Consultation between the parties is required, because the employee with a 
disability may have the best comprehension of the particular accommodation he 
or she needs.442 Where a technical expert is needed to assist in identifying and 
establishing suitable accommodation for the employee, the expert must make 
recommendations on such accommodation in consultation with both the 
employer and employee, for the purpose of ensuring accommodation that will 
cater to the needs of both.443  
 
The employer must take into account the person with a disability, the person’s 
type and extent of impairment, the effect of the impairment of the person and the 
job and working environment of the person, in providing specific accommodation 
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to the particular person with a disability.444 The person with a disability may also 
be reasonably accommodated either on a permanent or temporary basis, taking 
into account the person’s type of disability and the extent to which the person is 
disabled.445  
  
The measures of reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities include, 
but are not limited to –  
(a) adapting existing facilities to make them accessible for such persons; 
(b) adapting existing equipment or acquiring new equipment including 
computer hardware and software; 
(c) re–organizing workstations; 
(d) changing training and assessment materials and systems; 
(e) restructuring jobs so that non–essential functions are re–assigned; 
(f) adjusting working time and leave; and 
(g) providing specialized supervision, training and support in the workplace.446  
 
The employer may evaluate the work performance of the employee with a 
disability against the same standards as for other employees, but the type of 
disability the person has may necessitate an adaptation of the manner in which 
the employer measures such person’s performance.447 The Technical Assistance 
Guidelines state that the work performance of such employees should only be 
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assessed on the essential, and not the peripheral, job functions of the position in 
which the person with a disability is employed.448  
 
4.3 Practical application of the Disability Code and Technical Assistance 
Guidelines in determining whether or not a person with a disability 
has been reasonably accommodated  
  
The applicant in NEHAWU on behalf of Lucas and Department of Health 
(Western Cape)449 was as a result of her spinal injury unable to pick up heavy 
objects in the nursing department in which she performed cleaning duties.450 It 
was recommended that she be given “light duties”,451 but the Department of 
Health, who was the employer, held that there were no light duties available to 
her in the nursing department.452 Lucas was placed in the hospital’s needlework 
department on a temporary basis, because there was no vacancy in such 
department.453 
  
Lucas could not perform her work satisfactorily in the needlework department, as 
a result of, amongst others, the medication that she used in respect of her back 
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injury.454 She also applied for an administrative position in the hospital, to which 
she was not appointed.455 She was dismissed for incapacity due to ill health.456  
 
In determining whether the Department of Health had reasonably accommodated 
Lucas as a person with a disability, the Arbitrator considered item 6 of the 
Disability Code and Technical Assistance Guidelines.457 She stated that the 
purpose of reasonable accommodation is to enable people with disabilities to be 
employed and retained in employment.458 “Reasonable” accommodation for a 
person with a disability depends on the circumstances of both the workplace (and 
employer) and the employee.459 It also requires the parties to an employment 
relationship to jointly adopt a problem–solving approach to alter employment 
practices, to afford an employee with a disability an opportunity to perform a job 
similarly or equal to a similarly situated “able–bodied” employee.460  
 
The Arbitrator stated that if Lucas, her representative trade union and the 
Department of Health had adhered to the EEA, Disability Code and the Technical 
Assistance Guidelines, in conjunction with expert advice and – assistance, they 
could have identified and explored accommodation that would not impose an 
unjustifiable hardship on the employer.461 In respect of the Department of 
Health’s failure to reasonably accommodate Lucas in the nursing department 
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because there were no “light duties” in that department, the Arbitrator stated that 
“light duty” is not a job and that an employer could only mention it by referring to 
the content of a specific job.462 A “light duty” is “an abstract notion to denote low– 
intensity physical activity”.463 By mentioning that there were no “light duties” 
available in the nursing department, the employer was not exonerated from 
reasonably accommodating Lucas in that department.464 It could not produce 
evidence that the applicant’s work in the nursing department could not be 
adapted to suit her needs,465 nor did the Department of Health fulfil its obligation 
to reasonably accommodate Lucas in the nursing department by mentioning that 
she no longer was able to pick up heavy objects.466 On there being no vacancies 
for the post which Lucas held in the nursing department, the Arbitrator stated that 
reasonably accommodating a person with a disability may involve more than just 
looking at an alternative position for the person.467  
   
On the placement of Lucas in the needlework department on a temporary basis 
because there were no vacancies in that particular department, the Arbitrator 
stated that an employer should seek to permanently, and not temporarily,   
accommodate a person with a permanent disability.468  
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According to the Arbitrator, Lucas’s dismissal flowed from the fact that she was 
not appointed to the administrative position for which she applied, and not that 
the employer would incur unjustifiable hardship in reasonably accommodating 
her.469 The Department of Health did not reasonably accommodate Lucas in the 
nursing department or in the sewing department and only “accommodated” her in 
respect of the senior administrative position for which she applied.470  
 
In Wylie and Standard Executors and Trustees,471 the applicant was an estate 
administrator in a bank who, as a result of her multiple sclerosis, could no longer 
perform her work in an adequate manner. At a medical panel meeting, alternative 
accommodations for Wylie in respect of her illness were discussed.472 The 
proposed accommodations which were to be explored for three months, were to 
accommodate the applicant in her position as estate administrator, seek another 
position for her in the bank and assist her to pursue a position outside the 
bank.473  
 
Wylie’s failure to meet the performance standard of an estate administrator 
caused many of her estates to be diverted to other employees, which caused an 
increase in such employees’ workload.474 Management considered a half-day job 
not to be a practicable option for the applicant in the business environment in 
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which she was performing her job.475 The respondent’s Provincial Manager 
indicated to the applicant that she could not be accommodated in her current 
position as estate administrator.476 The applicant could not achieve the target of 
the amount of deceased estates that had to be processed and completed every 
year.477 Wylie considered obtaining a placement to another bank for the position 
of customer information consultant, but there was no vacancy for such a 
position.478  
 
The respondent employer indicated to Wylie that it would assist her in pursuing a 
position outside her job in the bank.479 The applicant did not wish to pursue a 
position outside the bank,480 but sought accommodation within the bank.481 She 
was dismissed for incapacity due to ill health.482 
 
The Commissioner at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
had to determine, amongst others, whether the respondent reasonably 
accommodated Wylie as a person with a disability prior to her dismissal.483 The 
Commissioner held that the respondent employer did not, as the Disability Code 
guidelines provide, restructure Wylie’s job so that peripheral functions to her job 
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as estate administrator could be re-assigned to other employees.484 The 
employer also gave no reasons for not adjusting working time and leave for the 
applicant.485 The Commissioner held that the management’s view that a half–day 
job would not be practicable in respect of Wylie, implied a difficulty to locate 
estate administrators that could do the applicant’s job,486 but that management 
nevertheless had to explore the possibility of a half–day post, which it did not 
seriously consider.487 
 
An occupational therapist did not play any role in any of the processes that had 
resulted in the dismissal of the applicant.488 The Commissioner also stated that, 
where none of the managers was qualified to determine reasonable 
accommodation for Wylie and where the Medical Advisor of Corporate Health 
advised that the applicant was not permanently incapacitated, the assistance of 
an occupational therapist had to be sought to effect appropriate reasonable 
accommodation for the applicant.489 
 
To look or wait for posts to become vacant for Wylie was insufficient reasonable 
accommodation for the applicant as a person with a disability.490 The employer 
merely diverted estates from the applicant as a measure or attempt of 
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accommodation.491 The Commissioner held that the employer failed to 
reasonably accommodate Wylie as a person with a disability.492 
 
In Standard Bank of South Africa v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration and Others, 493 Ms Ferreira, the third respondent (hereinafter “the 
respondent” or “the employee”) worked as a mobile home loan consultant for 
Standard Bank, the applicant (hereinafter also “the employer”). She sustained a 
back injury when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the course of 
employment.494 She returned to the position she held in the bank prior to the 
accident, but after her back injury exacerbated, the employer created an 
administrative position with lighter duties for the respondent.495  
 
The respondent found that the administrative post, by which she assisted other 
employees, was not challenging enough given her work experience and length of 
employment with the bank, which was 15 years at the time of the accident.496 
She later performed loan confirmation work, which she found motivating, but 
which caused her to experience pain, because she was required to speak on the 
telephone and write simultaneously.497 To enable her to perform such work 
effectively, the employee requested a placement in a particular division in 
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Standard Bank where telephone headsets were used.498 On the employer’s 
supposition that the employee would only perform such a job on a half–day 
basis, and that it accordingly had to create a position to that effect, it declined a 
placement to that division.499   
 
In her own division, the respondent was able to perform telephone duties if she 
was provided with a telephone headset.500 She requested a headset and 
communicated the costs thereof to her line manager, but the employer did not 
supply her with the telephone headset.501 The manager then required her to 
perform duties which did not involve the use of a telephone.502  
 
The employee was able to perform data capturing duties, but a workplace rule 
prohibited her from entering another employee’s password to be able to access a 
computer.503 She had her own password inserted in a computer to enable her to 
perform such duties, after which her line manager prohibited her from using the 
computer.504 She also refused to take up a position as switchboard operator that 
was proposed by her line manager and human resources consultant.505 The 
respondent’s line manager then required her to perform manual tasks, which 
proved painful, especially in light of her back condition and even though a 
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colleague assisted her.506 The employer regarded her as a poor performer in the 
workplace.507 It later employed her as a Home Loan Fulfilment Officer, but 
informed her approximately six weeks thereafter that she would be dismissed for 
medical incapacity.508 She was subsequently dismissed.  
 
The respondent was unable to “lift heavy objects [and]… raise her arms above a 
certain height”,509 nor could she work with a computer without experiencing pain, 
because of the height of the keyboard.510 She experienced difficulty to walk, sit or 
stand for long periods.511  She also performed duties even though she was in 
pain, experienced difficulty to work a full day and was absent from work for 
lengthy periods.512  
 
The respondent was unable to provide the applicant with medical reports that she 
was medically incapacitated, because she was not.513 Early retirement for the 
applicant was declined because medical experts from Standard Bank indicated 
that she was “not permanently incapacitated” and she should continue to work.514 
Medical practitioners on Standard Bank’s Corporate Health Panel on various 
occasions also recommended that an occupational therapist investigate and 
report on the respondent’s circumstances at work and present adjustments and 
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alterations to her workstation that would accommodate her disability.515 
Orthopaedic surgeons have also advised the applicant to fine–tune the 
workstation of the respondent.516  
 
The Labour Court stated that the employer did not involve an occupational 
therapist (hereinafter “a therapist”) to consult with the respondent and make 
recommendations on how her workstation could be adjusted, because the 
business unit that employed the respondent had to carry the costs of such a 
therapist’s report.517 Another reason why the employer failed to obtain the report 
was that such report might have instructed the employer to accommodate the 
employee, while the employer was adamant to dismiss her.518  
 
The court found that the applicant refused to provide the respondent with a 
headset, because it was believed that she would only be able to work half a 
day.519 Management was also disinclined to reallocate work to other employees 
in the event of the respondent being absent from work and the employer was 
disinclined to adjust her workstation,520 which were the motivations for not 
providing her with a headset.521  
 
                                                 
515 Ibid 
516 Ibid  
517 Ibid 364  
518 Ibid 365 
519 Ibid 
520 Ibid 
521 Ibid 
 97
Management was unwilling to allocate computer duties to the respondent 
because, in its view, the effects of the medication the respondent used rendered 
her incapable of performing such work.522 In this regard, the court stated that the 
line manager did not evaluate the respondent on the computers to determine 
whether the effect of her medication would indeed render her unable to perform 
such work.523 
 
The applicant did not provide the respondent with a comfortable chair as 
recommended by Corporate Health to ameliorate the effects of her disability.524 
The court found that the respondent herself chose a chair which had broken 
thrice and which the line manager did not replace nor repair when it had come to 
the latter’s attention.525  
 
The applicant did not want to place the respondent in a half-day confirmation 
administration job.526 The respondent admitted that she worked half a day, but 
that the other confirmation administrators would compensate for any purported 
lack of productivity on her part and that the provision of a headset would 
minimize the chances of such lack of productivity as it would enable her to work 
for longer.527 The court stated that the applicant did not offer any response to 
whether the respondent’s abovementioned proposed measure constituted 
                                                 
522 Ibid 366 
523 Ibid 
524 Ibid  
525 Ibid  
526 Ibid 367 
527 Ibid 
 98
reasonable accommodation and, if not, why such measure would impose an 
unjustifiable hardship on Standard Bank.528  
 
It also stated that the applicant did not adjust the workstation of the respondent, 
nor did it move her to the other business unit, which was provided with headsets, 
to perform work as a confirmation administrator529 and that, given the positions in 
which the respondent was placed following her accident, her manager wished to 
have her employment terminated, instead of accommodating her in the 
workplace.530  
 
The Labour Court further stated that an employer’s duty to reasonably 
accommodate employees and job applicant with disabilities is inherent to its duty 
not to discriminate against such persons, which is required by the Constitution 
and EEA.531 An employer acts unreasonably where it does not reasonably 
accommodate a person with a disability short of incurring an unjustifiable 
hardship where it is needed, or fails to explain why it does not accommodate 
such person.532 There is also a heavier duty on an employer to reasonably 
accommodate disability, as opposed to religion and culture because, in the words 
of the court “[p]ractising religious and cultural beliefs is a freedom whereas 
disability is an imposition.”533  
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The employer who has to provide reasonable accommodation for a person with a 
disability where it is needed, must find an accommodation and prove that it is 
reasonable.534 The employee, who requests a particular measure of 
accommodation, must prove that such measure is prima facie reasonable.535 
This person must also accept an accommodation that is reasonable, even though 
it is not the requested accommodation.536 The employer, on the other hand, must 
provide proper reasons for proposing certain measures of accommodation and 
declining others.537   
 
The court stated that the applicant had declined to accommodate the respondent 
as the accommodation would not be cost–effective, would pose a risk to her 
health and because she had admitted that she could not work.538 The employer 
had to follow the medical recommendations to procure an occupational therapy 
report, compel the employee to undergo an evaluation by an occupational 
therapist and pay for the therapist’s report, as it was in a position to do so.539 
Apart from the fact that the applicant was able to pay for the costs of the report, 
the necessity of the report being obtained – which could have prevented the 
employee’s dismissal on the basis of incapacity – prevailed over the costs 
thereof.540 The employer, furthermore, could not decide that such report was 
costly or inapplicable without firstly procuring it and following its 
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recommendations.541 In the absence of an occupational therapy report, the 
employer and employee could not effectively consult on how the employee is to 
be reasonably accommodated in her job or the working environment, as the 
parties lacked the essential information to do so.542 In addition to this, the 
employer also did not consider the measures of accommodation the employee 
proposed, which resulted in ineffective consultation between the parties.543  
 
With the employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate the employee, the former 
has an obligation to retain the latter in employment and not force or encourage 
her to resign.544 The court found that Standard Bank encouraged the employee 
to leave her employment, because discussions pertaining to early retirement 
ensued after the latter returned to work following her accident, and her line 
manager requested her to make application for early retirement, even though the 
employee wished not to.545 
 
Pillay J also held that the employer requested the employee to accept the 
position of a switchboard operator, which did not match the expertise she 
possessed and refused to equip her with a headset and computer with her own 
password that would enable her to perform work for which she had the skills, 
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expertise and capabilities.546 The employer also would have refused to place her 
in a half-day position even if she had requested such accommodation.547  
 
The court stated that the employee found loan confirmation work satisfying and 
had demonstrated that a chair which suited her back condition, a headset and 
the use of a computer with her own password accommodated her disability548 
and would enable her to perform such work. In this regard, the employer could 
not prove that the abovementioned measures were not reasonable 
accommodation that would enable her to work longer hours.549 Standard Bank 
also had a heavier duty to accommodate the employee as she was injured in the 
course of employment.550 
 
The employer placed the employee in positions that would not interrupt its 
business.551 This, the Labour Court found, constituted (mere) tolerance of the 
employee and not reasonable accommodation by the employer to retain her in 
employment.552 The employer also could not prove why the employee’s 
absenteeism or any of the proposed accommodations amounted to an 
unjustifiable hardship, which constituted discrimination on the basis of disability 
against her.553  
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The cases above have illustrated that an employer should not only “wait for 
better days” or for posts to become vacant, as it occurred in Wylie or search for 
“light duties” or an alternative position, which was the case with NEHAWU.  The 
Labour Court in Standard Bank v CCMA made it clear that an employer must be 
pro–active in reasonably accommodating an employee or job applicant with a 
disability and must do so short of incurring an unjustifiable hardship.  
 
4.4 Unjustifiable hardship 
 
“Unjustifiable hardship” is a limitation on an employer’s obligation to reasonably 
accommodate a qualified person with a disability, where needed.554 The UN 
Disability Convention also recognizes a “disproportionate or undue burden” as a 
limitation on the duty to reasonably accommodate people with disabilities.555 In 
Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v Renaud,556 Sopinka J stated in the 
context of accommodation of religious beliefs that: “[m]ore than mere negligible 
effort is required to satisfy the duty to accommodate. The use of the term ‘undue’ 
infers that some hardship is acceptable; it is only ‘undue’ hardship that satisfies 
this test. The extent to which the discriminator must go to accommodate is limited 
by the words ‘reasonable’ and ‘short of undue hardship’. These are not 
independent criteria, but are alternate ways of expressing the same concept.”557   
 
                                                 
554 Item 6.11 of the Disability Code. This was confirmed by the Arbitrator in NEHAWU at 2103 and  
     the Labour Court in Standard Bank v CCMA at 378.  
555 Article 2 of the UN Disability Convention 
556 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970  
557 Ibid  
 103
Item 6.11 of the Disability Code provides that an employer is not under an 
obligation to reasonably accommodate a qualified employee or applicant with a 
disability if such accommodation would impose an unjustifiable hardship on the 
business of an employer. The employer must firstly investigate the particular 
accommodation the person with a disability requires, how effective it will be in 
reducing the impact of the person’s disability on the person’s capacity to perform 
the essential functions of the job, as well as the costs of the accommodation, 
amongst others, before deciding that unjustifiable hardship will be incurred.558  
 
The Disability Code defines “unjustifiable hardship” as “action that requires 
significant or considerable difficulty or expense” and provides for two inclusive 
factors to consider in determining whether particular accommodation for a person 
with a disability, where needed, will impose an unjustifiable hardship on the 
business of the employer.559 The one factor, which represents the interest of the 
employee or job applicant with a disability, is the effectiveness of the 
accommodation for such person and the other factor, which represents the 
interest of the employer, is whether the specific accommodation would seriously 
disrupt the operation of the employer’s business.560 An employer needs to 
investigate both these factors to objectively determine whether it will incur 
unjustifiable hardship in respect of a particular accommodation. 561 In conducting 
such an investigation, the employer must consider what effect the provision of 
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reasonable accommodation will have on the person with a disability, as well as 
the effect if the person is not reasonably accommodated.562   
 
The Code further provides that accommodation for a person with a disability, 
which imposes an unjustifiable hardship on a specific employer at a given time, 
may not impose the same type of hardship for another employer or the same 
employer at another time.563 The Labour Court in Standard Bank v CCMA stated 
that there is no formula to determine what accommodation will amount to 
unjustifiable hardship and that each case in which an employer advances it, 
needs to be decided on its merits.564  
 
Item 6.18 of the Technical Assistance Guidelines provides that an employer 
should not use the cost of reasonable accommodation as an excuse not to 
provide it. The cost of reasonable accommodation is accordingly but one factor to 
consider in determining whether or not the accommodation will impose an 
unjustifiable hardship on the business of the employer. An employer who claims 
that a particular accommodation of a job applicant or employee with a disability 
will impose an unjustifiable hardship on its business, needs to prove the 
unjustifiable hardship.565 
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Ngwena states that the qualification of unjustifiable hardship seeks to maintain 
equilibrium between the interest of an employee or job applicant with a disability 
not to be discriminated against and the interest of an employer to manage its 
business in an open economy free from a disproportionate burden.566 He also 
states that unjustifiable hardship is premised on the principle of proportionality,567 
which is contained in section 36(1) of the Constitution.  
 
The employer must, accordingly, not limit the right of equality of the person with a 
disability (by refusing to reasonably accommodate the person in the workplace 
where needed) more than what is necessary and only to the extent that the 
purpose of the limitation is served, which is to not impose an unjustifiable 
hardship on the business of the employer. This is just another way of saying that 
an employer must give effect to the right of equality of a person with a disability, 
by reasonably accommodating the person where needed, short of incurring an 
unjustifiable hardship.  
 
If “reasonable accommodation” and “short of [unjustifiable] hardship” encompass 
the same notion according to the Canadian Supreme Court, it follows that a court 
or quasi-judicial body that has to determine whether an employer has reasonably 
accommodated a person with a disability, must assess whether the employer had 
done so short of incurring an unjustifiable hardship. If so, the employer has 
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reasonably accommodated the person with a disability. If not, the person with a 
disability has not been reasonably accommodated. Only unjustifiable hardship 
relieves an employer from its duty to reasonably accommodate such a person 
where needed and it requires employers to take more steps to eliminate disability 
discrimination, where reasonable accommodation is used as a non–
discrimination tool, and to advance affirmative action, where it is implemented as 
an affirmative action measure.568   
 
4.5 The inherent requirement of a job and an employer’s duty to 
reasonably accommodate an employee or job applicant with a 
disability   
 
The inherent requirement of a particular job may exclude a member of a specific 
group, for example a person with a disability, but reasonably accommodating 
such a person where needed may enable the person to enter the job.569 The 
Supreme Court of Canada devised a test in British Columbia (Public Service 
Employee Relations Commission v BCGSEU,570 albeit in the context of sex 
discrimination, to determine whether a “prima facie discriminatory standard” that 
an employer imposes for job performance constitutes a bona fide occupational 
requirement (or an inherent requirement of a job).571 The court stated that a 
prima facie discriminatory standard may impact negatively or exclude employees 
                                                 
568 Item 6.11 of the Technical Assistance Guidelines  
569 Cohen “Justifiable Discrimination – Time to Set the Parameters” (2000) 12 South African 
     Mercantile Law Journal  255 at 267 
570 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Hereinafter referred to as “BCGSEU”) 
571 Ibid paragraph 54 
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belonging to a specific group and the test sought to ensure that employers 
design and remodel employment and performance standards, which would 
include and accommodate in the workplace employees from all groups, short of 
this imposing an unjustifiable hardship on the employer.572  
 
If the BCGSEU test is applied to determine whether an employer can 
successfully defend a claim of disability discrimination on the basis of an inherent 
requirement of a job, the application thereof would be as follows:  
 
The employer, firstly, needs to show that the criterion it specifies as necessary 
for any person to be appointed to a job and discharge the essential functions of a 
job,573 was implemented for a legitimate work–related purpose and that there is a 
link between this purpose and the objective requirements of the particular job.574 
The court will then determine whether the employer imposed the criterion for a 
legally valid objective. 575 
 
Where a court has concluded that the imposed criterion has a legitimate 
objective, the employer, secondly, needs to show that it had genuinely and 
subjectively believed that the criterion was needed to achieve its legitimate 
objective and that it had no intention to discriminate against an employee or job 
                                                 
572 Ibid paragraph 55 
573 Item 7.1.2 of the Disability Code  
574 BCGSEU paragraph 58 
575 Ibid paragraph 59 
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applicant with a disability.576 Where an employer cannot establish the 
abovementioned requirement, the criterion will not constitute an inherent 
requirement of the job.577 
 
Where the two abovementioned requirements are met, the employer thirdly 
needs to show that the criterion was reasonably necessary to achieve its 
legitimate purpose, by establishing that it cannot reasonably accommodate the 
person with a disability without incurring an unjustifiable hardship.578 To 
determine whether the employer is able to prove this last requirement, a court 
needs to consider the factors the Canadian Supreme Court laid down in 
BCGSEU,579 which are:  
• whether the employer has explored other measures that do not 
discriminate against people with disabilities;580 
 
                                                 
576 Ibid paragraph 60 
577 Ibid  
578 Ibid paragraph 54. In Dlamini and others v Green Four Security [2006] 11 BLLR 1074 (LC), the 
     South African Labour Court stated at 1078 that where a court has found a workplace rule to be  
     an inherent requirement of a job, such rule may still discriminate against a person adversely  
     affected by it if it cannot reasonably accommodate the person. The court has acknowledged  
     the role that reasonable accommodation plays in respect of an inherent requirement of a job.  
579 Our Constitutional Court has relied on Canadian law in various cases: Western Cape  
     Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1995 (10)  
  BCLR 1289 (CC); Ferreira v Levin NO and Others and Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO 
  and Others 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and  
  others; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security and others 1996 (5) BCLR 609 (CC);  
  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC);  
  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
  1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v  
  Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v  
  National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re–integration of Offenders (NICRO) and  
  Others 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC); Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling and Others  
  2006 (10) BCLR 1133 (CC); AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council 
     and Another 2006 (11) BCLR 1255 (CC), to name but a few.  
580 BCGSEU paragraph 65 
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• if the employer found the abovementioned measures to exist, which could 
also achieve the legitimate objective of the employer’s criterion, why those 
were not applied to the person with a disability;581 
 
• whether all employees in the workplace (whether they have disabilities or 
are “able–bodied” persons) have to adhere this criterion or whether the 
employer can put a different criterion in place that would accommodate 
people with disabilities;582 
 
• whether the person with a disability can perform the job in a manner that 
would not discriminate against him or her and still fulfil the legitimate 
objective of the employer’s criterion;583  
 
• whether the application of the criterion achieves its legitimate purpose 
without unduly placing people with disabilities at a disadvantage;584 and  
 
• whether all the involved role players have discharged their duty to search 
for reasonable accommodation for the person with a disability.585 
 
With regards to the third requirement of the BCGSEU test, the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated that a court needs to consider the processes an employer 
                                                 
581 Ibid  
582 Ibid  
583 Ibid  
584 Ibid  
585 Ibid  
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underwent to accommodate the person where needed, as well as the content of 
an alternative yardstick an employer proposes which accommodates the person, 
or why an employer failed to propose such a criterion.586 Where an employer can 
accommodate a person with a disability short of incurring an unjustifiable 
hardship, its criterion does not constitute an inherent requirement of the job, in 
terms of the BCGSEU test.587 Where the employer cannot accommodate the 
person with a disability short of incurring an unjustifiable hardship, its criterion 
imposed will amount to an inherent requirement of the job.588  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
An employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate a person with a disability, where 
needed, does not entail tolerating the person or making concessions for the 
person in a job or working environment. The employer must not only make the 
required “modification[s] and adjustment[s] to a job or … the working 
environment…”589 just for the purpose of taking such measures, but do so in a 
manner that will enable the person with a disability to “have access to or 
participate or advance in employment”.590 Reasonable accommodation is more 
about substance than form. An employer make take various measures to adjust 
and modify the job and working environment of a person with a disability and still 
                                                 
586 Ibid paragraph 66 
587 Ibid paragraph 67 
588 Ibid paragraph 55 
589 Section 1 of the EEA 
590 Ibid 
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not reasonably accommodate the person, as it occurred in NEHAWU and 
Standard Bank v CCMA.  
 
Of course, this does not mean that an employer should go beyond itself to 
reasonably accommodate such a person if this will impose an unjustifiable 
hardship on its business. The EEA and Disability Code relieve employers of their 
duty to reasonably accommodate if this will impose an unjustifiable hardship on 
its business. A failure to reasonably accommodate an employee or job applicant 
with a disability where needed constitutes an infringement of such person’s right 
to equality, and such an infringement by an employer will only be authorised in 
limited instances, where the latter is able to prove an unjustifiable hardship on its 
business.  
 
In McGill v University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v Syndicat des 
employés de l’Hôpital general de Montréal,591 the Supreme Court of Canada 
stated, in the context of reasonable accommodation of an employee with a 
disability, that an employee should not be afforded less protection in the 
workplace than that which is prescribed by human rights legislation.592 Protecting 
the right of equality of people with disabilities in the employment sphere, by 
reasonably accommodating them where needed – whether it occurs in the 
context of non–discrimination or affirmative action – should accordingly not be 
less than that afforded to them in the Constitution.  
                                                 
591 [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161  
592 Ibid paragraph 20 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISABILITY AND DISMISSAL 
 
5.1 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995593 
 
The LRA provides that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the 
dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee directly 
or indirectly on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to, disability.594 
Section 187(2)(a) of the Act states that despite the abovementioned provision, a 
dismissal may be fair if the reason thereof (direct or indirect unfair discrimination 
on the basis of disability) is based on an inherent requirement of the particular 
job.  
 
A dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove 
that the reason for the dismissal is a fair reason that relates to the employee’s 
conduct or capacity or is based on the employer’s operational requirements 
(substantive fairness) and the employee was dismissed in accordance with a fair 
procedure (procedural fairness).595 The LRA provides that any person who has to 
determine whether the dismissal of a particular employee is substantively and 
procedurally fair, must take into account any relevant code of good practice (that 
                                                 
593 Hereinafter “the LRA” 
594 Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA  
595 Section 188(1) of the LRA 
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includes the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal596) issued in terms of the Act.597 
In proceedings concerning the dismissal of an employee, the employee must 
establish the existence of a dismissal598 in terms of section 186(1) of the LRA 
and, if so established, the employer must prove that the dismissal was 
substantively and procedurally fair.599  
 
Section 191(1)(a) of the LRA provides that, where there is a dispute regarding 
the fairness of a dismissal, amongst others, the dismissed employee may refer 
the dispute in writing to a bargaining or statutory council, if the parties to the 
dispute fall within the registered scope of that council, or to the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA) if no bargaining or statutory 
council has jurisdiction. The dismissed employee must make the referral to the 
council or CCMA within 30 days of the date of dismissal600 or, if it is a later date, 
within 30 days of which the employer made a final decision to dismiss or uphold 
the dismissal of the employee.601 The dismissed employee must be able to show 
to the council or the CCMA that a copy of the referral of the dispute had been 
served on the employer602 and the council or CCMA must attempt to resolve the 
dispute through conciliation.603 
 
                                                 
596 Schedule 8 to the LRA  
597 Section 188(2) of the LRA 
598 Section 192(1) of the LRA 
599 Section 192(2) of the LRA 
600 Section 190(1) of the LRA provides that the “date of dismissal” is the earlier of the date on 
     which  the employee’s contract of service terminated or the employee left the service of the  
     employer.    
601 Section 191(1)(b)(i) of the LRA 
602 Section 191(3) of the LRA 
603 Section 191(4) of the LRA 
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If a council or a Commissioner certifies that the dismissal dispute remains 
unresolved, or if 30 days have expired since the council or the CCMA received 
the referral and the dispute remains unresolved, the employee may refer the 
dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication if the employee has alleged that the 
dismissal was effected for an automatically unfair reason,604 or to the CCMA if 
the parties to the dispute agree in writing.  
 
The LRA provides that, if a dismissal is automatically unfair, the Labour Court 
may in addition to reinstatement, re–employment or compensation to the 
employee, make any other order that it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances.605 If compensation is awarded to an employee whose dismissal is 
found to be automatically unfair, it must be just and equitable in all the 
circumstances, but not more than the equivalent of 24 months’ remuneration that 
is calculated at the employee’s remuneration rate at the date of dismissal.606 
 
The LRA also provides that an order or award of compensation that is made in 
terms of Chapter 8 of the LRA (that deals with unfair dismissals, amongst 
others),  is in addition to, and not a substitute for, any other amount to which an 
employee is entitled to in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of 
employment.607 An order or award of compensation to an employee who has 
been dismissed for an automatically unfair reason accordingly does not take the 
                                                 
604 Section 191(5)(b)(i) of the LRA 
605 Section 193(3) of the LRA 
606 Section 194(3) of the LRA 
607 Section 195 of the LRA 
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place of any other amount that such employee is entitled to in terms of any law, 
collective agreement or contract of employment. 
 
An automatically unfair dismissal is “automatically unfair” because the law 
prohibits the reason for the dismissal608 such as direct or indirect unfair 
discrimination on the basis of disability, which the Constitution, EEA and LRA 
amongst others, proscribe. Where the law prohibits the reason for the dismissal, 
a court must necessarily find that such dismissal is unfair.609 This means that, 
where a court is satisfied that direct or indirect unfair discrimination on the basis 
of disability is the reason for an employee’s dismissal, the court must conclude 
that the employee’s dismissal is unfair, unless the employer can show that the 
reason thereof is based on an inherent requirement of the particular job in which 
the dismissed employee was employed, which may render the dismissal fair if 
the employee was also dismissed in accordance with a fair procedure.  
 
When an employee alleges that an employer has effected an automatically unfair 
dismissal, a court must determine the true or actual reason for the dismissal.610 
This means that a court must determine whether the prohibited reason the 
employee alleges (for example, direct or indirect unfair discrimination on the 
prohibited ground of disability) is the actual reason for the dismissal. Where a 
court has determined the actual reason for the dismissal, it must further 
                                                 
608 Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 224 
609 Ibid 225 
610 Ibid 
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determine whether such reason falls within the scope of section 187(1) of the 
LRA that deals with automatically unfair dismissals.611 
 
When an employee alleges a prohibited reason for dismissal (that would render 
the dismissal automatically unfair) and an employer advances that the dismissal 
was for a valid reason (that might render the dismissal fair), a court must 
scrutinize the relationship between the valid reason the employer claims and the 
prohibited reason the dismissed employee alleges.612 The Labour Appeal Court 
in Kroukam v SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd,613 per Zondo JP, stated that a court should be 
cautious to conclude that a dismissal had been effected for a prohibited reason, 
unless there is ample evidence before the court with which a judge can 
substantiate this finding.614  He also stated that a court should even be more 
cautious to conclude that an automatically unfair dismissal had been effected 
where evidence indicates that the employer might have had a valid reason to 
dismiss the employee.615  
 
When an employee is dismissed for a permissible reason, but alleges that a 
prohibited reason for dismissal played a subordinate or minor role in such 
dismissal, a court must determine to what extent the prohibited reason had 
“contaminated” the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee.616 Zondo JP 
                                                 
611 Ibid 
612 Ibid 
613 [2005] 12 BLLR 1172 (LAC) 
614 Supra 1201  
615 Ibid 
616 Grogan op cit 226 
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stated in Kroukam that a dismissal will also be automatically unfair where the 
prohibited reason has “played a significant role in the [employer’s] decision to 
dismiss” the employee, even if this reason was not the main reason for the 
dismissal.617 
 
In the same case, Davis AJA stated that section 187 of the LRA requires the 
dismissed employee who alleges an automatically unfair dismissal to produce the 
court with evidence that raises a convincing possibility of the presence of an 
automatically unfair dismissal to the court.618 Thereafter, the employer must 
provide evidence to the court to prove that the employee was not dismissed for a 
reason that would render the dismissal automatically unfair.619 
 
The onus of proof in automatically unfair dismissals was discussed in Janda v 
First National Bank.620 The Labour Court held that in a dispute concerning an 
alleged automatically unfair dismissal, the onus of proving that the dismissal was 
substantively and procedurally fair rested on the employer throughout the 
proceedings.621 The dismissed employee has a burden to produce sufficient 
evidence to show that he or she was not dismissed for the valid reason that the 
employer had advanced, but for another prohibited reason that would render the 
dismissal automatically unfair.622 If an employee fails to do so, the person may be 
                                                 
617 Kroukam 1206 
618 Ibid 1224  
619 Ibid 
620 (2006) 27 ILJ 2627 (LC) 
621 Supra 2633 
622 Ibid 2634 
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unsuccessful in claiming an automatically unfair dismissal,623 because the 
employer’s evidence of a valid reason would be uncontested. After both sides to 
the dismissal dispute had presented their evidence, the court must decide 
whether the employer had proved that the employee’s dismissal was 
substantively and procedurally fair.624 According to the court in Janda, an 
employee who alleges an automatically unfair dismissal does not have to 
produce evidence that such a dismissal had taken place before the court will 
hear the matter.625  
 
5.2 The dismissal of an employee for reason of disability 
 
An employee who claims to have been automatically unfairly dismissed for 
reason of direct or indirect unfair discrimination for reason of disability, must 
prove a dismissal626 and provide a court with sufficient evidence that his or her 
disability was the reason or cause for dismissal.627 A court that such employee 
approaches in respect of a dismissal dispute, may utilize the SACWU v Afrox 628 
test that was referred to in Chapter II of this paper, to determine whether 
disability was both the factual and legal cause (and subsequently the reason) for 
                                                 
623 Ibid 
624 Ibid 
625 Ibid 2634 – 2635  
626 Cohen “Onus of Proof in Automatically Unfair Dismissals – Janda v First National Bank (2006) 
    27 ILJ 2627 (LC)” (2007) 28 ILJ 1465 at 1471  
627 In Pedzinski v Andisa Securities (Pty) Ltd (Formerly SCMB Securities (Pty) Ltd) [2006] 2 BLLR  
    184 (LC), the Labour Court stated at 201 that an employee who claims that an automatically  
    unfair dismissal had taken place for reason of unfair discrimination on the basis of disability,     
    needs to establish on a balance of probabilities and with supporting evidence, a causal nexus  
    between his or her dismissal and unfair discrimination on the basis of disability.       
628 (1999) 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC) 
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dismissal. If so, the dismissal for reason of the employee’s disability will be 
automatically unfair, unless the employer can prove that such reason was based 
on an inherent requirement of the particular job.  
 
In terms of the application of the BCGSEU629 test of the Supreme Court of 
Canada as discussed in Chapter III of this paper, the employer who bases a 
dismissal for reason of an employee’s disability on an alleged inherent 
requirement of the particular job, needs to prove to a court that it could not 
reasonably accommodate the employee short of incurring an unjustifiable 
hardship. An employer who is unable to establish the abovementioned 
requirement, cannot rely on section 187(2)(a) of the LRA. The employer who is 
able to establish this, can rely on section 187(2)(a) of the LRA and the dismissal 
of the employee may be fair if the employer effected it in accordance with a fair 
procedure.  
 
Reasonable accommodation of an employee who has a disability, short of 
incurring an unjustifiable hardship, plays an important role, not only to determine 
whether an otherwise automatically unfair dismissal of the employee was 
premised on an inherent requirement of the particular job, but also whether an 
employer sought to retain the employee in employment, which will be discussed 
below.  
 
                                                 
629 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGSEU [1999] 3  
     S.C.R 3 
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5.3 The Code of Good Practice on the Employment of People with  
 Disabilities 
 
The Disability Code provides that employees who become disabled during 
employment should be reintegrated into work, where it is reasonable, and 
employers should seek to reduce the effect an employee’s disability has on the 
person.630  
 
When an employee acquires a disability, the employer must consult with the 
employee to determine whether it can reasonably accommodate the employee’s 
disability.631 In remaining in contact with the employee, the employer should also 
encourage the employee to early return–to–work, where this is reasonable.632 
The early return–to–work for the employee concerned, may call for vocational 
rehabilitation, transitional work programmes, or temporary or permanent flexible 
working time, where this is needed.633 
 
When an employee is frequently absent from work due to an illness or injury on 
his or her part, the employer must, in consultation with the employee, determine 
whether the latter is absent due to a disability that the employer needs to 
reasonably accommodate.634 
 
                                                 
630 Item 11.1 of the Disability Code 
631 Item 11.2 of the Disability Code 
632 Item 11.3 of the Disability Code 
633 Ibid 
634 Item 11.4 of the Disability Code 
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The Disability Code provides that employers should explore the possibilities of 
offering alternative work, reduced work or flexible work placement for the 
employee with a disability, where this is reasonable, so that employees are not 
persuaded, or do not become obliged, to resign from their employment.635  
 
The Code also states that an employer may dismiss an employee who has a 
disability if the employer is unable to retain the employee in terms of the 
provisions mentioned above.636 The dismissal must be for a fair reason and in 
accordance with a fair procedure, as the LRA requires.   
 
When an employer dismisses employees who have disabilities for reasons based 
upon operational requirements, the employer’s selection criteria must not either 
directly or indirectly unfairly discriminate against people with disabilities.637 The 
Disability Code also states that employers, who provide disability benefits to their 
employees, must ensure that employees are appropriately advised before they 
apply for such disability benefits and before such employees resign from 
employment due to medical conditions.638 
 
According to Van Zyl v Thebe Employees Benefits Risk Group (Pty) Ltd,639 the 
Disability Code, which has been issued in terms of the EEA, will be applicable to 
the dismissal in terms of the LRA of an employee who has a disability, where the 
                                                 
635 Item 11.5 of the Disability Code 
636 Item 12.1 of the Disability Code 
637 Item 12.2 of the Disability Code 
638 Item 12.3 of the Disability Code 
639 [2004] 10 BALR 1298 (CCMA)  
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employee’s disability or the failure of an employer to reasonably accommodate 
the employer’s disability was the reason for dismissal.640  
 
More importantly for the purposes of this Chapter, the Commissioner stated that 
items 10 and 11 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal (hereinafter “the 
Dismissal Code”), which deals with the guidelines for dismissals for incapacity 
due to ill health and injury, echo some of the thoughts of items 11 and 12 of the 
Disability Code.641 The Disability Code will accordingly be applicable to 
dismissals based on incapacity due to the ill health or injury of the employee.642  
 
5.4 Items 10 and 11 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal 
 
The incapacity of an employee due to ill health or injury is a fair reason for 
dismissal, which an employer must prove in terms of the LRA.643 Items 10 and 11 
of the Dismissal Code deal with effecting a dismissal on this ground. These 
provisions, together with the Labour Court’s interpretation thereof in Standard 
Bank v CCMA and others,644 will be discussed.    
 
The Dismissal Code provides that incapacity on the grounds of ill health or injury 
may be temporary or permanent.645 If the employee is temporarily unable to 
                                                 
640 Supra 1306 
641 Ibid 
642 Ibid 
643 Section 188(1)(a)(i) of the LRA 
644 [2008] 4 BLLR 356 (LC) 
645 Item 10(1) of the Dismissal Code 
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work, the employer must investigate the extent of the incapacity or injury of the 
employee.646 When an employee is likely to be absent from work for an 
unreasonably long period due to ill health or injury, the employer should 
investigate all the possible alternatives short of dismissal.647 In determining 
appropriate alternatives other than dismissal for the absent employee, the 
employer should consider, amongst others, the nature of the employee’s job, the 
employee’s period of absence, the seriousness of the illness or injury of the 
employee and the possibility of securing a temporary replacement for the 
employee.648 When ill health or injury has permanently incapacitated an 
employee, the employer should consider securing alternative employment for the 
employee, or adapting the duties or work circumstances of the employee to 
accommodate the “disability” of the employee.649 
 
The Dismissal Code also provides that, when the employer investigates the 
extent of the employee’s ill health or injury and possible alternatives short of 
dismissing the employee, amongst others, the particular employee should be 
allowed the opportunity to state a case in response and to be assisted by a fellow 
employee or trade union representative in doing so.650 The above provision gives 
effect to the audi alterem partem principle.  
 
                                                 
646 Ibid 
647 Ibid 
648 Ibid 
649 Ibid 
650 Item 10(2) of the Dismissal Code 
 124
The degree of the incapacity is relevant to the fairness of any dismissal based on 
the ill health or injury of the employee.651 The “degree” of the incapacity is the 
extent to which the employee’s ill health or injury has incapacitated the person.   
The cause of the incapacity is also relevant to the fairness of a dismissal.652 
Where an employee’s incapacity is caused by substance abuse or dependency, 
the employer may consider counselling and rehabilitation for the employee as 
appropriate steps short of dismissing the employee.653 
 
An employer’s duty to accommodate the incapacity of an employee is also more 
onerous when the employee has contracted a work–related illness or was injured 
at work.654  
 
The Dismissal Code provides in item 11 that a person who has to determine 
whether a dismissal arising from medical incapacity is unfair, should consider 
whether or not the employee is capable of performing the work.655  
 
The Code further states that where the employee is not capable of performing 
the work that was previously performed, the Arbitrator or Commissioner should 
further consider the extent to which the employee is able to perform his or her 
work.656 The extent to which the work circumstances of the employee might be 
                                                 
651 Item 10(3) of the Dismissal Code 
652 Ibid 
653 Ibid 
654 Item 10(4) of the Dismissal Code 
655 Item 11(a) of the Dismissal Code 
656 Item 11(b)(i) of the Dismissal Code 
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adapted to accommodate the employee’s “disability” must be considered.657 
Where the employee’s work circumstances cannot be adapted, it must be 
considered whether and to which extent the employee’s duties might be 
adapted.658 Finally, it must also be considered whether suitable alternative work 
is available to the employee who is not capable of performing the work.659  
 
The Labour Court in Standard Bank v CCMA660  stated that an employer may 
take days or even years to investigate whether an employee may validly be 
dismissed for incapacity due to ill health or injury.661 The investigation into and 
subsequent determination whether an employee is medically incapacitated, 
depends on whether there is a likelihood that the employee may recover from the 
ill health or injury, whether adjustments in the working environment ameliorate 
the effects of the employee’s medical condition and whether accommodating the 
employee in the working environment will impose an unjustifiable hardship on the 
employer.662  
 
Having due regard for the issues an Arbitrator or Commissioner will consider in 
terms of item 11 of the Dismissal Code, in determining the fairness of a dismissal 
for medical incapacity, the court in Standard Bank stated that an employer’s 
investigation whether an employee is medically incapacitated, has four stages:663  
                                                 
657 Item 11(b)(ii) of the Dismissal Code 
658 Ibid 
659 Item 11(b)(iii) of the Dismissal Code 
660 [2008] 4 BLLR 356 (LC)  
661 Supra 372  
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• The employer must firstly investigate whether or not the employee 
concerned is able to perform the work he or she performed before the 
illness was contracted or the injury sustained.664 If the employee can do 
so, the employer must place the person in the position he or she held 
before the illness or injury.665 The specific position the employee is placed 
in should also be the choice of the employee, where this is possible, and 
should match the capability of the employee.666 Only when the employee 
cannot perform the work that was performed before the illness or injury 
and the medical condition persists or is permanent, should the employer 
proceed to the following three stages of investigation in terms of the 
Dismissal Code.667  
 
• Secondly, the employer must factually establish, through an investigation 
and with medical– or other expert advice where needed, the effect the 
employee’s disability has on the ability of the person to perform the  
work.668   
 
• Thirdly, after establishing the abovementioned effect, the employer should 
first attempt to adapt the work circumstances of the employee, before 
resorting to adapting the duties of the employee, because an employer 
                                                 
664 Ibid  
665 Ibid 
666 Ibid 
667 Ibid 
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should preferably reinstate the ill or injured employee where it is 
possible.669   
 
• Fourthly, if neither the employee’s work circumstances nor the duties can 
be adapted to suit the disability of the person, the employer must 
investigate whether any suitable alternative work is available for the 
employee.670 
 
With the provisions of the Disability Code being applicable to dismissals for 
medical incapacity, and the Dismissal Code referring in its medical incapacity 
guidelines to the “disability” of a permanently incapacitated employee671 and one 
who was considered to be incapable of performing the work due to medical 
capacity,672 the next question is begged:  
 
5.5 Is disability, which is a prohibited reason for dismissal, equivalent to 
incapacity, which is a fair reason for dismissal?  
 
Christianson states that the incapacity of an employee due to poor work 
performance or ill health or injury entails a situation where the employer 
legitimately loses confidence in the employee’s ability to perform the job in 
                                                 
669 Ibid 
670 Ibid 373  
671 Item 10(1) of the Dismissal Code 
672 Ibid item 11(b)(ii) 
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accordance with the contract of employment.673 When an employee is dismissed 
for incapacity due to ill health or injury, it means that an employee is by reason of 
such ill health or injury unable to perform the job according to the performance 
standard that was set by the employer.674 An incapacity dismissal is also a no– 
fault dismissal,675 because there is no blameworthiness on the part of the 
incapacitated employee.676 
 
She states that even though items 10 and 11 of the Dismissal Code refer to 
“disability” in respect of the guidelines pertaining to ill health and injury, 
“incapacity” and “disability” are two distinct legal terms.677 An incapacitated 
employee is an employee who cannot perform the essential functions of the 
job.678 A suitably qualified employee with a disability and who is appropriately 
reasonably accommodated in the workplace will be able to discharge the 
essential functions of the job.679  
 
In Standard Bank v CCMA, the Labour Court had to review a CCMA arbitration 
award680 that an employee’s dismissal for medical incapacity was both 
substantively and procedurally unfair.681 The court held that “[d]isability is not 
                                                 
673 Christianson “Incapacity and Disability : A Retrospective and Prospective Overview of the Past 
     25 Years” (2004) 25 ILJ 879 at 882 
674 Ibid 883 
675 Ibid 884 
676 Ibid 883 
677 Ibid 889 
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679 Ibid 
680 Ferreira and Standard Bank of SA (2006) 27 ILJ 1547 (CCMA)  
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synonymous with incapacity.”682 It stated that an employee who has a disability  
is incapacitated when an employer cannot reasonably accommodate the person 
without incurring an unjustifiable hardship, or when an employee unreasonably 
rejects reasonable accommodation offered by an employer, both instances in 
which an employer may validly dismiss such an employee.683 This approach to 
incapacity is in line with item 12.1 of the Disability Code, which permits an 
employer to dismiss an employee with a disability where the latter cannot be 
reasonably accommodated without the former incurring unjustifiable hardship. An 
employer, however, may not dismiss an employee who has a disability, but is not 
incapacitated (in other words, a person whom the employer can reasonably 
accommodate, without suffering unjustifiable hardship), as it would render the 
dismissal unfair.684  
 
Commissioners and the Labour Court have ruled the dismissals of people with 
disabilities for medical incapacity to be unfair where such employees were not 
incapacitated due to ill health or injury.  
 
In NEHAWU on behalf of Lucas and Department of Health (Western Cape),685 
the Arbitrator at the bargaining council had to determine whether the dismissal of 
Lucas for medical incapacity was fair. In this case, it was ruled that an employer 
confronted with a medically incapacitated employee also had the additional duty 
                                                 
682 Standard Bank v CCMA 378  
683 Ibid 
684 Ibid 
685 (2004) 25 ILJ 2091 (BCA) 
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to determine whether the particular employee is a person with a disability in 
terms of the EEA, even where the employee does not claim to be such.686 This 
duty, which flows from the Dismissal Code, is part of an employer’s obligation to 
ascertain whether there is a fair reason to dismiss the particular employee.687 
The Arbitrator held that items 10 and 11 of the Dismissal Code appeared to 
pertain only to dismissals for incapacity due to ill health and injury, but that an 
employee with an impairment that constitutes a disability also had a right to be 
reasonably accommodated under the EEA688 and not to be dismissed on the 
basis of disability.689  Item 10 of the Dismissal Code should be interpreted to also 
include “people with disabilities” in terms of the EEA690 and item 11(b)(ii) of the 
Dismissal Code briefly mentions people with disabilities in respect of the lengths 
an employer should go to accommodate a disability.691  
 
The Arbitrator stated that the LRA‘s Dismissal Code dealt with dismissals in 
general, including that of people with disabilities and it came into operation 
before the EEA (or any of the EEA’s Codes) came into force.692 The EEA’s 
Disability Code, however, encapsulated issues much broader than the LRA’s 
Dismissal Code, because the former Code deals with the “full employment 
cycle,”693 whereas the LRA’s Dismissal Code only deals with dismissal.694  
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The Arbitrator held that the applicant was a person with a disability, but not 
medically incapacitated and her dismissal was substantively unfair.695 The 
respondent also viewed Ms Lucas’s spinal injury as a permanent incapacity and 
attempted to accommodate her as such under the Dismissal Code, instead of 
reasonably accommodating her as a person with a disability under the EEA and 
Disability Code.696  
 
In Wiley and Standard Executors and Trustees,697 which confirmed NEHAWU, 
the Commissioner had to determine the fairness of Wylie’s dismissal for medical 
incapacity. A medical report showed that even though she was living with 
multiple sclerosis, she was not permanently incapacitated as a result thereof.698 
The Commissioner found that the employer did not reasonably accommodate her 
as a person with a disability, but instead treated her as a “poor performer”.699 Her 
dismissal for medical incapacity was found to be substantively and procedurally 
unfair.700  
 
Similar to NEHAWU and Wylie, the Labour Court in Standard Bank found that the 
dismissed employee was a person who had a disability, the employer failed to 
reasonably accommodate her as such, without incurring unjustifiable hardship, 
and that her dismissal for medical incapacity was unfair.701  
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Other than the Arbitrator in NEHAWU and Commissioner in Wylie, the court in 
Standard Bank went one step further, which was to find that the employer also 
discriminated against the employee on the basis of disability when it failed to 
reasonably accommodate her short of incurring an unjustifiable hardship.702 
Moreover, it also stated “[w]hen an employer follows a flawed procedure to 
dismiss a disabled employee, it is impossible to divorce discrimination from the 
duty to accommodate.”703  
 
Perhaps the Arbitrator in NEHAWU and Commissioner in Wylie refrained from 
finding that the employers’ failure to reasonably accommodate the dismissed 
employees also constituted discrimination against them, because a bargaining  
or statutory council or the CCMA does not have jurisdiction to deal with 
discrimination issues. Perhaps the Labour Court in Standard Bank made the 
additional finding of discrimination because it has the power to deal with 
discrimination matters. Be that as it may, NEHAWU and Wylie were decided 
before Standard Bank and the latter case has introduced an aspect that may 
prospectively affect the jurisdiction of a council or the CCMA to hear disputes 
concerning medical incapacity dismissals that involve employees with disabilities.  
 
 
                                                 
702 Ibid 387  
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5.6 The jurisdiction of an Arbitrator or Commissioner post–Standard 
Bank v CCMA, to hear a dismissal dispute pertaining to medical 
incapacity which involves an employee with a disability  
 
It is interesting that the court, in Standard Bank, made the additional finding of 
discrimination upon review of the arbitration award relating to the employee’s 
dismissal704 and even though the employee had not advanced discrimination 
before the Commissioner.705 The court also stated that even though the facts and 
evidence before the Commissioner indicated that the employee was 
discriminated against, no duty rested on the former to consider this issue.706  
 
How does one sidestep the discrimination issue that flows from a finding that the 
employee’s dismissal for medical incapacity was unfair, due to the employer’s 
failure to reasonably accommodate the employee short of incurring an 
unjustifiable hardship, so that the jurisdiction of a council or the CCMA is not 
affected in such an instance?  One approach may be to say that, according to 
Standard Bank, where disability is distinguished from incapacity, an employer’s 
failure to reasonably accommodate an employee who has a disability does not 
indicate that the employee was discriminated against, but that the employee was 
not incapacitated.707 Such an approach may seem valid to enable a council or 
the CCMA to “retain” its jurisdiction so to continue to resolve the dispute on its 
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merits, but is blind to the true essence of a failure to reasonably accommodate 
short of an unjustifiable hardship, which is something that falls beyond the 
jurisdiction of such a forum.  
 
Surely, one cannot deny that a failure to reasonably accommodate a person who 
has a disability, short of incurring unjustifiable hardship, amounts to 
discrimination on the basis of disability, even if this transpires in a forum that 
does not have jurisdiction to deal with this matter. The council or CCMA, who 
deals with a medical incapacity dismissal dispute, must not ignore a 
discrimination issue that surfaces from a finding that the dismissal was unfair 
because of a failure on the part of the employer to reasonably accommodate the 
employee short of unjustifiable hardship. In these circumstances, the forum 
should also not continue to resolve the dispute on its merits simply because the 
dismissed employee alleged that the reason for the dismissal was medical 
incapacity.  
 
In Wardlaw v Supreme Moulding (Pty) Ltd,708 the Labour Appeal Court held that 
the true reason for the employee’s dismissal will determine which forum will have 
jurisdiction to resolve a dispute pertaining to a dismissal for this reason, and not 
the reason the employee alleges.709 When an employee alleges a reason for a 
dismissal and approaches a forum which, upon the employee’s allegation, will 
have jurisdiction to resolve a dispute in respect of such a dismissal, the forum 
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must assume jurisdiction up to where it determines the true reason for the 
dismissal.710 If the true reason for dismissal falls into the ambit of dismissals in 
respect of which the forum may resolve disputes, the forum must continue to 
resolve the dismissal dispute on its merits.711 If the true reason does not fall into 
such ambit, the forum must decline jurisdiction and refer the dispute to the 
appropriate forum for resolution.712  
 
The appropriate forum for resolving a dismissal dispute pertaining to medical 
incapacity which involves an employee who has a disability is a bargaining or 
statutory council or, if no such council has jurisdiction, the CCMA,713 who will first 
attempt to conciliate the dispute. If the council or a commissioner certifies that 
the dispute remains unresolved, or if 30 days have expired since the forum 
received the dispute and it remains unresolved, the forum must arbitrate the 
dispute if the employee alleged that the reason for the dismissal was medical 
incapacity.714  
 
When an employer accordingly dismisses an employee who has a disability for 
medical incapacity, and an employee refers a dispute pertaining to this dismissal  
to a council or the CCMA, such forum must assume jurisdiction over the matter, 
up to where it determines the true reason for the dismissal. How will this forum 
determine the true reason for dismissal when the employee approaches it to 
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determine the validity of a medical incapacity dismissal? As was stated earlier, 
an employer who wishes to dismiss an employee for medical incapacity must 
determine whether the employee is also a person with a disability in terms of the 
EEA. This duty rests not only on the employer,715 but also on the forum that 
needs to determine the validity of the dismissal.716 
 
Once the forum is aware that the employee dismissed is also a person with a 
disability, it needs to determine whether the employee’s disability or incapacity 
was the reason for dismissal. In terms of Standard Bank, the forum should 
determine this by considering whether the employer was able to reasonably 
accommodate the employee, without suffering an unjustifiable hardship.                      
If the forum finds that the employer could not reasonably accommodate the 
employee without incurring an unjustifiable hardship, or that the employee 
unreasonably refused reasonable accommodation an employer proposed and 
the employee was thereupon dismissed, the employee is incapacitated. In this 
instance, incapacity and not disability is the reason for the dismissal. A dismissal 
dispute for the true reason of medical incapacity falls within the jurisdiction of a 
bargaining or statutory council or the CCMA and such forum has the jurisdiction 
to determine whether a dismissal for medical incapacity is fair.  
 
If the forum finds that the employer could reasonably accommodate the 
employee, short of incurring an unjustifiable hardship, but failed to do so and 
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dismissed the employee, the person is not incapacitated, and disability – not 
incapacity – is the reason for the employee’s dismissal. With disability being the 
reason for dismissal, and discrimination being implied due to the employer’s 
failure to reasonably accommodate, even if this is not alleged by the employee, 
the council or CCMA must decline jurisdiction and refer the matter to the Labour 
Court for adjudication.    
 
The Labour Court in Standard Bank accurately contended that “[i]f Ferreira (the 
employee) wanted to refer a claim based on discrimination she would have had 
to refer it to this Court, not to arbitration”,717 but erred when it said that the CCMA 
Commissioner “was not obliged to respond” to the discrimination that transpired 
from the case before the latter.718 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
An employee who has a disability may be perceived as being incapacitated, 
which may “justify” dismissing the employee on this basis. Moreover, the 
Dismissal Code in its medical incapacity guidelines refers to the “disability” of an 
incapacitated employee. It is easy to confuse these two concepts, especially in 
the context of dismissal. Some may view these concepts as one and the same, 
                                                 
717 Ibid 388 
718 Ibid 
 138
because of the manner in which they appear in the Dismissal Code’s medical 
incapacity guidelines. 719 
 
If disability of an employee is a prohibited reason for dismissal and medical 
incapacity a fair reason for dismissal, then these two concepts are not the same. 
If an employer wishes to dismiss an employee who has a disability for medical 
incapacity (or wishes to hide a disability dismissal under this veil, which is after 
all a fair reason for dismissal), the employer must prove that the employee is 
medically incapacitated. Apart from the fact that the employer must follow items 
10 and 11 of the Dismissal Code and follow a fair procedure in dismissing the 
person,720 the employer must also prove that it could not reasonably 
accommodate the employee, short of incurring an unjustifiable hardship, or that 
the employee unreasonably refused reasonable accommodation the employer 
proposed. In doing so, and in Christianson’s view, the employer must prove that 
the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the job.721 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This paper approached the concept of disability in the workplace from four 
angles: the definition of people with disabilities, which was discussed in Chapter 
2, discrimination on the basis of disability in terms of the EEA as discussed in 
Chapter 3, reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities in Chapter 4 
and dismissal of employees who have disabilities in Chapter 5. Each of these 
discussions above hopefully holds lessons for the South African workplace.  
 
Change often begins in the minds of people. If the social approach to disability 
(as discussed in Chapter 2 above) is adopted with the notion that people with 
disabilities have potential and that “able–bodied” society needs to change to 
cater to the needs of disabled people, discrimination against and exclusion of 
that group from employment and the working environment no longer appears to 
be justifiable. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has 
endorsed the social model of disability and places a burden on signatory states, 
including the Republic of South Africa, to do the same. Employers also need to 
make this change in mindset towards people with disabilities.  
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Once the mindset is changed, it becomes time to act. The employer, who wishes 
to differentiate amongst employees or applicants for employment on the basis of 
disability or some other medical condition in respect of an employment position, 
must opt for an individual assessment of the person living with the disability or 
medical condition, rather than a blanket exclusion of such persons from a 
position. The cases of Hoffmann v South African Airways and IMATU and 
another v City of Cape Town, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this paper, have 
made it clear that individual assessments, rather than blanket employment bans 
will, in such circumstances, prevent unfair discrimination against a person living 
with a disability or medical condition. 
 
Reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities is another powerful tool 
in the hands of an employer to effect changes to an “able–bodied” working 
environment or an employment position designed for an “able–bodied” person.722 
Especially in respect of people with disabilities, reasonable accommodation short 
of imposing an unjustifiable hardship on the employer, is a multi–faceted 
mechanism that facilitates equality for people with disabilities in the workplace, 
guards against an automatically unfair dismissal on the basis of disability723 and 
even is a criterion to determine whether an employee with a disability is 
incapacitated due to ill health or injury.724 
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According to the Labour Court in Standard Bank v CCMA, which was discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5 of this paper, the disability of an employee does not amount 
to his or her medical incapacity.725 If these two concepts meant the same, the 
LRA would not have distinguished between medical incapacity as a valid ground 
for dismissal and disability as a prohibited reason for dismissal. Employers must 
appreciate this distinction in terms of the LRA and accordingly not treat an 
employee or job applicant with a disability as being medically incapacitated, 
unless it is established that the person is also incapacitated.   
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